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ABSTRACT

This is an essay on the labeling literature, some reflec
tions, some critical comments, some tenative ideas.
The essay
is an unfamiliar form for a sociological thesis.
A reader
demands to know o n e ’s hypothesis, or at least theoretical
position where no empirical evidence is a va il a bl e. But label
ing has been plagued by hypotheses and theoretical stances,
so much so that some of its insights into deviance have been
obscured.
It needs a fresh interpretation, one that hi gh 
lights the social issues it seeks to explain, and a fresh
assessment in light of those issues.
That is the goal of
this essay.
What follows presents an inventory of lab el in g1s ideas,
a critical assessment of their conceptual and empirical use
fulness and a methodological strategy for understanding the
central issues described by labeling.
In particular, the
essay concentrates on lab el in g ’s assertion that social me an 
ings and social reactions are important components of an
understanding of deviance in modern societies.
Although
la be li ng ’s treatment of these components is found wanting,
the components themselves are still seen as essential to
sociological and criminological inquiry.
An ideal type framework is developed, using Weber as an
authority.
Four types are distinguished: respectable,
involuntary, aberrant and dissident deviance.
Each is suggested
as having distinct social meanings; and each meaning is
suggested as having a distinct influence on the likelihood
that labeling or deterrence will result from official
sanctioning.
A brief application of this methodological
strategy to juvenile delinquency suggests its heuristic
validity.

A CRITIQUE OF THE LABELING APPROACH
TOWARD A SOCIAL THEORY OF DEVIANCE

INTRODUCTION

This essay is about the labeling approach and its under
standing of deviance in modern society.

It is not, for a

number of reasons, a particularly timely topic.

For one

thing, judging by the opinions recently expressed in journals
and professional meetings, a considerable number of social
scientists are ready to discard the .approach as either hope
lessly ambiguous or simply exhausted (see Gibbs,
Manning,

1973; 1975).

1972;

Moreover, recent assessments of the

approach are directed toward uncovering its "latent conserva
tive biases"
Schervish,

(see Gouldner,

1968;

Liazos,

1972; Davis,

1972;

1973; Thio, 1973), an event in current sociology

that usually sounds the death toll—
of P a r s o n s 1s s y s t e m ’s theory.

recall the criticisms

In. brief, the popular validity

that sustained labeling during the seven years •following
B e c k e r ’s (1963) Outsiders has been replaced by an equally
popular scepticism.
Of course, one can always go against the tide,
labeling against the current conventional wisdom.

support
But even

the a p p r o a c h ’s original theorists are raising damaging cri
ticisms about l a b e l i n g ’s empirical and conceptual status.

In

the second edition to a collection of originally formative
essays on labeling,

Lemert

(197 2: 16) describes the a pp r o a c h ’s

2
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development in a single terse paragraph.
What began as some tenative and loosely linked ideas
about deviance and societal reactions in my writings
subsequently were replaced by the theoretical state
ments of Becker that social groups create deviance and
that deviant behavior is that which is so labeled.
This
position got further elucidation in Eriksdn's function
alist derived position that the social audience is the
critical factor in deviance study.
In retrospect these
must be regarded as conceptual extrusions largely r e 
sponsible for-the indiscriminating application of label-,
ing theory to a diversity of research and writing on
deviance.
Unfortunately, the impression of crude socio
logical determinism left by the Becker and Erikson state
ments has been amplified by the tendency of many deviance
studies to be preoccupied with the work of official agents
of social control, accenting the arbitrariness of official
action, stereotyped decision-making in bureaucratic con
texts, bias in the administration of law, and the general
preemptive nature of s o c i e t y Ts control over deviants.
Although Lemert urges the "proper" development of labeling,
Manning (197 3) suggests that this essay signifies the
approach*s inevitable atrophy, bringing to an end the concep
tual period initiated by labeling theorists.
himself justifies the argument,

Lemert (19 74)

for several years later in a

presidential address to the Society for the Study of Social
Problems he urges theorists to abandon earlier claims and to
go beyond M e a d ’s interactionist framework.
Why then write about the labeling approach?

For one

thing, present criticism crudely reject the entire approach,
and although labeling possesses a number of misleading claims-,
many of which will be presented in a later part of this essay,
it also possesses some insightful and frequently neglected
directions for deviancy studies.

Unlike the normative perspec

tive, in which research focuses on the personal and social
characteristics of deviants, the labeling approach draws

4
-
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attention to the interaction between those who commit deviant
acts and those in a position to pass moral judgments upon those
actors.

Accordingly, research and theory-building over the

past ten years has been directed toward a number of important
questions about deviance and social reactions: When is a
deviant act likely to be severely sanctioned?

When is a

deviant act likely to stimulate little or no reaction?
rules are enforced by legitimate social reactions?
conditions are these rules enforced?
label to whom?

Whose

Under what

Who applies the deviant

What consequences does the application of a

deviant label have for a person?

These are significant ques

tions that are neglected by normative theorists, and they are
questions that are obscured by a hasty rejection of labeling's
central focus.
Furthermore, an overly simplified rejection of labeling
obscures the re-emphasis the approach places on classical
concerns about the social meanings of deviance in modern
society.

Although normative theorists ostensibly note the

modern context in which deviance occurs

(there is always some

mention of normative plurality), they do not direct research
or theory toward understanding this context.

Rather normative

studies concentrate on the legitimate but narrow issue of
what causes people to commit deviant acts; they do not attempt
to understand the relationships between deviance, ascribed
social meanings and the social order of modern society.

It

was, ironically, Durkheim who concerned himself and his writings
with these relationships.

In the Division of Labor (1964a),

Durkheim described the precariousness of solidarity in modern
society, and he briefly elaborated the role deviance plays
both in upsetting and reinforcing that solidarity.
works, especially Suicide

His later

(19 52) and Rules of Sociological

Method (1964b), further explored some of the roles deviance
plays in modern society, such as providing a focus for group
identification or as heralding a new collective conscience.
Like labeling theorists

(see Erikson,

19 66; Douglas,

1970a),

Durkheim conceived of the study of deviance as the study of
the affirmation and construction of moral meanings in every
day life.

It is this concern with the broader social mean

ings of deviance, especially as they are designated by social
reactions, that is lost by a total rejection of the approach.
Labeling also, at least potentially, converges with
several current orientations in sociology and criminology.
For one, the conflict approach, represented by such theorists
as Sellin (1938), Void (1958), Turk (1966) and Quinney (1970),
describe modern society as involving moral disagreement-.
Sellin (1938:

29) makes this point in a passage that adum

brates la be li n gfs description of the modern world.
The more complex a culture becomes, the more likely it
is that a number of normative groups which affect a
person will be large, and the greater the chance that
the norms of these groups will fail to agree, no matter
how much they overlap as a result of common acceptance.
Another complementary approach centers around the studies on
"respectable" deviance.
Sutherland

In an article on white-collar crime,

(194 0) argues that rarely is deviant behavior

committed by people of high status in the course of their

occupation recorded in police statistics.

Although these

deviants cost men and women considerably more than convention
al criminals

(Sutherland and Cressey,

1974; Pearce,

1973),

they rarely face the same amount of social reaction that is
directed toward lower status criminals.

Both Sutherland and

Sellin suggest, like the labeling theorists, that deviance in
modern society is intricately associated with social defini
tions and the power of some to have their definitions strictly
enforced.

By emphasizing the importance of reactions in ex

plaining deviant behavior,

labeling suggests some social

relationships that would more fully integrate the studies on
conflict and respectable crime.
All of this, the research questions, the classical
issues, the convergence with studies on conflict and respec
table deviance,

is not presented as evidence of lab el i ng fs

extraordinary explanatory powers.

As many have argued,

the

approach is_ excessively loose, conceptually inconsistent,
difficult to empirically verify and prone toward vulgariza
tion and politicalization.

But confusion, as Emerson once

said, need not be indication of defective intelligence:

it

may* at times, be simply an honest mind working on an
inherently difficult and complex problem.

Undoubtedly,

some'

of lab e li ng ’s difficulties indicate just this honest reflec
tion on an inherently complex problem—
deviance in modern society.

the social meanings of

By concentrating simply on the

a p p r o a c h ?s conceptual and empirical confusion, the critics
obscure the complexity of the social issues it seeks to

understand.

The task of criticism, therefore , is to assess

labeling according to these issues, according to the concep
tual problems it seeks to unravel, and where it is found
wanting,

suggest alternative strategies for research and

theory.

This is the task of this thesis.

There are, however, a number of issues and problems
associated with labeling, and their conceptual complexity
prevents a thorough assessment of the approach, at least
within the scope of this paper.

As a result7, this paper will

concentrate primarily on those aspects of labeling that seek
to understand what is socially made of an act, what that
definition suggests about social reactions and what conse
quences those reactions are likely to have for a deviant.
The pages that follow will describe the basic ideas of label
ing and assess its utility as an explanatory framework.

From

this assessment, especially as it applies to the social m e a n 
ings of deviance, a different strategy for understanding
deviance in modern society will be presented, one that will
hardly solve all the problems revolving around the approach,
but one that will make some of them more understandable.

CHAPTER I
INVENTORY OF IDEAS

Although the labeling perspective has dominated the
literature for twelve years, there is an embarrassing amount
of disagreement about exactly what is labeling*s approach to
deviant behavior.

Critics seem more confused than anyone.

Rock (1974), for instance, claims that labeling is too phe
nomenological, enmeshing it. in reductionism, yet Douglas
(1970a) laments labeling*s lack of phenomenological focus.
Similarly, Lemert

(1974) calls for labeling theorists to go

beyond Mead*s interactionist perspective, while others
(see Rogers and Buffalo, 1974; Schervish,

1973) criticize the

literature for ignoring Mead*s central insights.

At times,

the confusion results from the misguided efforts of critics
and proponents alike to attribute labeling to some classical
perspective—

so that the criticism might seem more coherent

or the defense more convincing.

At other times, however, the

confusion reflects a real looseness in the approach itself
(Taylor, Walton and Young,
question-—

1973), which leads to a pertinent

in what way can any set of assumptions and ideas

assume to be the labeling approach to deviant behavior?
The word labeling hardly captures the subtle differences
between such theorists as Becker (1963) and Lemert

8

(1951;

1967),

9
Erikson (1966) and Matza (1969) or Kitsuse (1964) and
Scheff (1966).

Still, there is a sense in which a core, a

trunk, can be identified amidst these subtle branches of
labeling, and this, using G i b b s Ts (1966) term, is labeling1s
"conception" of deviant behavior.

Whereas previous theories

conceive of deviance as the infraction of some agreed-upon
rule, portraying deviants as sharing some social or personal
attribute by which the infraction can be explained, labeling
conceives of deviance as the product of social interaction,
logically seperating the act and the judgments people make
about them (Becker, 1971).

The following passage by Becker

(19 63: 9), perhaps the most quoted description of labeling’s
position, points this out.
D e v i an ce ... is created by society.
I do not mean this
in the way it is ordinarily understood, in which causes
of deviancies are located in the social situation of
the deviant or in the "social factors" which prompt his
action.
I mean, rather, social groups create deviance
by making the rules whose infraction constitutes
deviance, and by applying those rules to particular
people and labeling them as outsiders.
From this point
of view, deviance is not a quality of the act a person
commits, but rather a consequence of the application by
others of rules and sanctions to an "offender."
The
deviant is one to whom that label has been successfully
applied; deviant behavior is behavior people so label.
Some people who act oddly are committed to mental hospitals,
some are not; some people who break the laws are arrested and
sent to prison,

some are not; some people who drink too much

are labeled "alcoholics," some are not—

the differences be

tween those who are labeled deviant and those who are not
depends on what others make of the act, what social judgments
are made and what responses those judgments provoke from actor

10
and audience alike.

According to labeling theorists,

deviance

is not simply a violation of some agreed-upon rule; rather
deviance is the outcome of processes of social definition and
social reaction.
In other words, Becker argues that the labels people
apply to behavior are logically independent, of any act in
itself.

In one sense, such a statement is blatantly true.

Since Durkheim, at least, sociologists and criminologists, have
recognized that designations such as "normal" and "abno rm al ,"
"conforming" and "deviant" are socially specific,
to history, cultures and subcultures.

specific

Only the most unregener-

ate biological determinist or structural-functionalist would
quibble with labeling*s contention that deviance resides in
social definitions and reactions, rather than in the acts or
persons committing them (Akers,
as other labeling proponents,

19 68).

But Becker, as well

is making a bolder claim:

the acts people commit and the labels people attach to them
are seperate, not simply in the abstract but in specific
situations as well.

In this sense, there are no neat categories

of deviance or crime, only categories of people who have been
isolated and distinguished from others by the social defini
tions and reactions applied to them (Kitsuse and Cicourel,

19 63).

As Erikson (19 66) argues, by defining deviance this way,
the labeling approach highlights certain aspects of deviance
that had been frequently taken for granted in earlier con
ceptions.

For instance, Merton*s

(197 5) theory of anomie,

still a central framework for deviance research,

is designed

11

to account for behavior that strays from community norms,
regardless of whose standards those norms represent.

Con

sequently, the banker who sifts through the d a y 's loan re
quests making decisions according to race and the armed robber
who takes from him the d a y fs receipts are both deviants, since
both in their own way violate the community's norms.

But the

banker, regardless of the effects of his actions, even if he
is largely a cause of the robbery, faces different consequences
for his actions than those faced by the armed robber.

The

banker seldom provokes the community's ire, while the armed
robber sets in motion the community's entire social control
mechanism.

Although the labeling analysts sometimes express
0

interest in "secret" deviants or self-typing, all agree that
those rule-breakers who are singled out by the police, mental
health personnel, the courts or other official audiences face
adjustment problems concerning "spoiled identity" that hidden
deviants do not.

An aim of labeling’s conception,

then, is

to focus attention on the consequences of being labeled an
outsider, especially when the labeling is done by official
control agents.
Preeminently, the labeling approach involves an inter
actional process in which relative social judgments are the
primary determinant of deviance.

This conception of deviance

has led to several related yet distinguishable lines of
questioning.

The first, and the least elaborated by labeling

theorists, asks questions about the social order.
rules are enforced?

Whose

Whose reactions are likely to be

compelling?

The second asks questions about the applica

tion of labels.

Who is more likely to be labeled a deviant?

What influence do official stereotypes and interests have on
enforcement policy?

Finally, the third line of questioning

simply asks what are the consequences of being labeled a
deviant?

The following paragraphs present some of the answers

labeling theorsists have provided to these questions, answers
that have become known as l a b e li ng Ts approach to deviant
behavior.

R u l e s , Reactions and the Social Order
Whose reactions, whose social judgments are likely to
be more compelling than others?

When labeling theorists

defined deviance according to actual social reactions, they
pinpointed a theoretical problem, but not an answer.

In other

words, what is the conceptual difference between rules that
are not enforced and reactions that are not forceful?

Kitsuse

(1964), for instance, found the reactions of college students
to homosexuals to be "generally mild."
mild reaction constitute deviance?

Does a generally

If not, how harsh must a

reaction be before it can be described as deviance?
one of B e c k e r ’s (1963:

Similarly,

11) observations leads to confusion.

After his example of labeling, in which a young Trobriand
Islander is "forced" to commit suicide by the public denuncia
tion of another native, Becker concludes:

"You can commit clan

incest and suffer no more than gossip as long as no one makes
a public accusation..."

Why is gossip an insignificant reaction

13
Whatever the merits of label in g1s position, as Gibbs

(19 66)

points out, it is not without difficulty, for it never says
exactly what identifies an act as deviant.
Gibbs, of course,
so obvious reasons.

is right, but he is right for some not

While labeling is in need of some con

ceptual house cl ea ni n g, the difficulty rests with the very idea
of labeling or more specifically with the relationship between
social reactions and labeling.

In K i t s u s e ?s (19 64) study of

student reactions toward homosexuals, negative responses,
regardless of their intensity,
deviant.

identified homosexuality as

What it did not do, however,

is equally important:

it did not effectively differentiate the homosexuals from the
other students, the deviants from the nondeviants.
differentiation process is what Becker (1963:
to as successful labeling.

This

9) referred

A frequently quoted passage

by the early criminologist Tannenbaum (19 38: 19-2 0) describes
it fairly well.
The process of making the criminal (of successful
labeling) therefore, is a process of tagging, defining,
identifying, segregating, describing, emphasizing,
making conscious and self-conscious; it becomes a way
of stimulating, suggesting, emphasizing, and evoking
the very traits that are complained of...The person
becomes the thing he is described as being.
A reaction to illicit behavior can be almost anything—

from

the generally mild responses of the students in K i t s u s e Ts
study to the more dramatic denunciation of the young Trobriand
Islander—
'someone.

any of which define the behavior as deviant to
In this sense, it is odd that labeling proponents

identify reaction as the crucial and forgotten element of

m
deviance.

What is crucial, however,

is the point at which

social reactions become social labeling.

And it is about this

matter that labeling theorists are disturbingly silent.
In part, the difficulty rests with l ab e l i n g fs adherence
to H e a d ’s interactionist framework.
a subjectivist stance,

Insofar as labeling takes

it must deal with each person in their

own right, facing,. interpreting and dealing with the reactions
of others (see Blumer,

1969:

61-77).

As Lemert

(1951:

74-75)

explains it:
The importance of the p e r s o n Ts conscious symbolic
reactions to his or her own behavior cannot be overstressed
in explaining the; shift from normal to abnormal behavior
or from one type of pathological behavior to another,
particularly where behavior variations become systematized
or structured into pathological roles...the self-defining
junctures are critical points of personality genesis and
in the special case of the atypical person they mark a
division between two different types of deviation.
The two types, of course, are primary and secondary deviance,
a distinction that will be taken up later.
however,

For the moment,

it is important to understand that this emphasis

upon "conscious symbolic reactions” constructs an inescapable
tautology for the labeling theorists.

Any social reaction

is potentially one that will effectively label a person and
their behavior,

since effectiveness depends upon the deviants

own symbolic reaction.

Effective labels and reactions, accord

ing to this scheme, are simply those that are effective.
accounts for the tendency of observational studies,

This

such as

S c o t t ’s (1969) analysis of the "blindness system” or R a y ’s
(1964) portrayal of relapse among heroin addicts, to provide
evidence of labeling by inferring the impact of social responses

15
through the d e v i a n t ’s own perceptions of stigma.
Nevertheless,

labeling theorists, at least implicitly,

suggest that official reactions—

that is, the reactions by

police, judges and other formal control agents—
to result in labeling.

are likely

Such determinism is in some respects

opposed to M e a d ’s subjectivism, and it is hard not to admire
the ingenuity with which labeling analysts appear to anchor
it in a subjectivist framework.

Building on some traditional

ideas of symbolic interactionism Csee Hughes,

1945; Garfinkel,

1956), labeling theorists describe public reactions as essen
tially ’’degradation ceremonies.”

In a criminal trial, a proto

typical degradation ceremony, a p e r s o n ’s personality is eras
ed and replaced with a cultural label-- a ’’rapist” or a ’’thief.”
Schwartz and Skonlick (19 64) document this effect in a quite
limited yet frequently quoted study of legal stigma.

After

confronting twenty-five employers with four types of person
nel folders, each containing a different degree of legal stig
ma (no record, acquitted, acquitted with a letter of reassur
ance from the judge and convicted as ch ar ge d) , Schwartz and
Skolnick found the folders with the most stigma (convicted
and acquitted without a letter) to fair poorly in the job
market.

One employer expressed interest in a convicted fold

er; three expressed interest in the acquitted without a letter
folder.

The other two folders were more marketable.

Nine

employers expressed interest in the folder with no. record;
six employers expressed interest in the acquitted with a letter
folder.

Using similar studies

(see Simmons,

19 69; Scheff,

16
19 66), labeling proponents document the existence of similar
public stereotypes,

stereotypes that supposedly come into

play once a person is officially reacted to as a deviant.
While labeling analysts are uncertain about some r ea c 
tions, allowing a p e r s o n ’s subjective response to be the
final word on importance, public reactions are uniformly
seen as overwhelmingj regardless of the d e v i a n t ’s symbolic
interpretation.

Mead

(1918:

590) himself,

in a classic

essay on the psychology of punitive justice, referred to
legal stigmas as the modernization of taboos.
I refer to that accompanying stigma place upon the
criminal.
The revulsions against criminality reveal
themselves in a sense of solidarity with the group, a
sense of being a citizen which on the one hand excludes
those who have transgressed the laws of the group and
on the other inhibits tendencies to criminal acts in the
citizen himself.
It is this emotional reaction against
conduct which excludes from society that gives to the
moral taboos of the group such impressiveness.
It is this moral taboo that labeling refers to when it speaks
of stereotypes, of the d e v i a n t ’s difficulty in "shaking off"
public labels and of the compelling nature of being officially
declared a deviant—

recall B e c k e r ’s example of the young

Trobriand Islander.

Although labeling theorists never

adequately explain why there should be so much agreement about
the "disdainful" qualities of rule—breakers and so much dis
agreement about the rules themselves
Lemert, 1972:

(see Becker,

1963:

15-18;

26-61), they still assert that official reactions

attribute a "master status" to a p e r s o n ’s misconduct, a status
that changes interaction patterns and effectively alters,
time, a v i o l a t o r ’s perceptions of himself.

in

Official reactions,

17
then, are reactions that label.
This concern with official reactions has led some label
ing analysts to explore the creation of formal rules— • that
is, rules that are enforced by some official group of people.
Again, labeling theorists, like many conflict analysts
(see Turk, 1966; Quinney,

1970), argue that modern society

is characterized by conflicts over values and expectations.
What is right for one person often proves deviant for another.
In addition to laws revolving around life, property and per
son, modern society generates a vast amount of "regulatory
laws," laws dealing with health, public safety, welfare,
business practises and transportation.

In each of these

cases, the moral meanings, particularly the moral obligation
to obey, depends largely on a p e r s o n Ts relationship to the
group whose interests and values are represented by the rules
(Lemert,

19 72).

The content of laws, and correspondingly the

rules potentially enforceable by control agents, depends on
the ability of certain groups to have their values and in
terests cast into legal forms.

In this sense, labeling ana

lysts rightfully stress that one of the most important deter
minants of a rule, of its content and who it potentially de
fines as deviant,

is the absence of certain groups in the col

lective interaction that generates laws.

To a degree, label

ing theorists portray social conflict much as Dahrendorf
(1959:

179-193) does,

in which organized groups generate sup

port for their values from less conscious groups.

The main

medium for this process, at least for labeling theorists,

is

18
the mass media.
To illustrate, Becker

(1963:

135— 146), who has done

some of the conceptual work in this area, describes what he .
calls moral enterprising as an endeavor to construct part of
s o ci et y’s moral fabric.

As an example, he interprets the

passage of the Marijuana Tax Act in 19 3 7 by the United States
Congress.

Principally through the efforts of the Bureau of

Narcotics, then under the Treasury Department, public concern
about the ’’dangerous” use of marijuana was generated by a
public information campaign.

Although the Treasury Department

itself minimized the problem of marijuana in its 1931 yearly
report, the Bureau generated enough support to have a draft
of the bill presented before the House Ways and Means Committee
in 1937.

After some minor revisions to safeguard the legitimate

interests of business, the bill was passed in both the House
and Senate.
as follows:

Becker (1963 : 145) sums up the. b i l l ’s passage
’’Marijuana smokers, powerless, unorganized,

lacking legitimate grounds for attack,

and

sent no representatives

to the hearings and their point of view found no place in the
record...The eneterprise of the Bureau produced a new rule,
whose subsequent enforcement would help create a new class of
outsiders—

marijuana smokers.”

Similar processes are described in P l a t t ’s (1969) ex
planation of delinquency laws, G u s fi el d’s (19 68) interpreta
tion of the enactment of the Prohibition Amendment, and D u s t e r ’s
(1970) analysis of anti-drug legislations.

What is important

in these studies is that interests are described as sometimes
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more symbolic than material in nature.

As Gusfield argues,

the Prohibition Amendment is a classic example, for it was
largely a middle-class, rural, Protestant movement aimed at
controlling the values of lower-class, urban,
immigrants.

Catholic

In this light, the making of rules, especially

in the instance of moral crusades,

is a symbolic act,

symbol

izing the importance or superiority of a g r o u p ’s way of life.
Both Duster and Platt make similar arguments.

In this sense,

labeling analysts perceive the legal definition of deviance,
especially with regard to crimes without victims, as the ef
forts of middle- and upper-class Americans to formalize their
values and control behavior they see as deviant.

And, of

course, from a labeling point of view, rule-making is an im
portant example of how social control causes deviance.
In another sense, however, the significance of moral
crusades rests not in their origins, but in their outcomes:
in the legitimation of a police force.

In other words, while

it is up to rule-makers to create categories of deviance,

it

is up to another type of moral entrepeneur, rule-enforcers,
to apply the laws and create a class of outsiders
1963).

(Becker,

Offenders must be discovered, apprehended and convict

ed, and this job falls to professional enforcers who have
interests and values of their Own.

Accordingly,

labeling theo

rists end up back at the source of labeling, at the applica
tion of rules by police,

judges and other officials (for a

critique of this circle see Gouldner,

1968; T h i o , 1973).

the labeling approach, the way in which officials enforce

In
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r u l e s , the manner in which they recruit people as o u t s i d e r s ,
largely determines who is and who is not deviant.

Enforcement and the Applicatiori of Labels
Schur '(1971: 82-99) refers to the study of "deviance
processing” organizations as central to the understanding of
the ways in which social control shapes and even, in a sense,
causes deviant behavior.

From what has been said, he is quite

right, at least insofar as labeling is concerned.
not uniformly enforced.

Rules are

Some rules are enforced only when

they result in certain consequences.
presents a clear example.

The unmarried mother

While school officials are unlikely

to approve of promiscuity, they seldom do anything until a
girl becomes pregnant—

then she is expelled.

applied more to certain people than others.

Some rules are
Again, while the

unwed mother is often forced to leave s ch oo l ,.the b o y , who is
also responsible,

is seldom treated in the same fashion.

Some rules, furthermore, are variously enforced over time.
The occurrence of "drives" against certain kinds of deviance,
like gambling or homosexuality,
clearly.

for instance,

indicates this

These things taken together suggest the differential

manner in which rules are enforced.

And the manner in which i/'

officials go about enforcing rules, apprehending people,
processing deviants,

"treating" them and so on, identifies

those people who are to become known as outsiders.
For the most part, la b e l i n g ’s contentions are supported
by the literature on complex organizations.

Research in this
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area has repeatedly documented the existence of informal
rules which emerge within the formal structures of organiza
tions.

In one classic of the field, Gouldner's

(1954)

Patterns of B ur ea u cr ac y, the consequences of enforcing inac
tive formal rules, as well as the practicality of their en
forcement, are described for a company that mined gypsum rock
near one of the Great Lakes.

According to Gouldner, the

plant moved at an informal pace for many years.

Many of the

employees used plant materials, and for the most part it was
a pleasant d a y fs labor, despite complaints from company
headquarters about low production and excessive waste.

After

the old manager died though, things changed; headquarters
sent in a new manager with orders to tighten up.

Before long

miners were being fired for doing things that were previously
considered legitimate.

While the new manager successfully

reinstated the formal rules with regard to surface operations,
his efforts to bureaucratize the more dangerous mining opera
tions failed.

In the mines unpredictability was high and

cooperation was crucial.

G o u l d n e r fs study,

like the better

labeling research, demonstrates the importance of organiza
tional form and social situations in determining what rules
will be enforced and who will be labeled deviant.
This informal side of enforcement and its relation to
social situaions has been brought out in several studies con
ducted from a labeling orientation.

Bittner (1967a), for in

stance, shows how the rules of policeman and peace officer
are sometimes exchanged by patrolmen on Skid Row.

According
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to Bittner, patrolmen on Skid Row keep the peace by culti
vating personal relationships with residents, holding little
regard for culpability, and making decisions geared more
toward solving situational problems than the formal rules.
At least on Skid Row, rules are applied differentially in
order to manage residential tension.
(1965)

Similarly, Sundow

observes the importance of informal arrangements be

tween the Public D e f e n d e r fs Office and the P ro secutorTs
Office.

Often arrangements go beyond simple plea-bargaining,

reflecting what the public defender and prosecutor consider
to be a "normal” crime.

In this sense, the categorization of

an act determines what portions of the legal code a deviant
will be charged with and thus the possibilities for
plea-bargaining.

In both of these cases, as with G ou l d n e r fs

study, informal rules emerge between the demands of situation
al tensions and organizational interests.
Unfortunately,
tions.

B i t t n e r Ts and Sundew*s studies are excep

Labeling research tends to underplay the importance

of organizational interests and tensions in generating in
formal rules.

Instead, research concentrates on documenting

selectiveness in applying labels, principally through the in
fluence of informal stereotypes.
Weinberg (1968:

Deviants, Rubington and

5) argue, are "persons who are typed socially

in a very special sort of way.

They are assigned to categor

ies and each category carries with it a stock interpretive
accounting of any persons contained under the rubric."
ing focuses- on the content of these stereotypes in order

Label
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to describe what kinds of people are more likely to be defin
ed as deviant.

An excellent example of this can be found in

P i l i a v i n ’s and B r i a r ’s (196M-: 210) observations on police
encounters with juveniles, in which they stress the "cues"
officers use to distinguish delinquents from nondelinquents.
...both the decision made in the field— whether or not
to bring the boy in— and the decision made at the sta
t io n— which disposition to invoke— were based largely
on the cues which emerged from the interaction between
officer and the youth, cues from which the officer in
ferred the y o u t h ’s character.
These cues included the
y o u t h ’s group affiliations, age, race, grooming, dress,
and demeanor.
Older juveniles, members of known delin.quent gangs, Negroes, youths with well-oiled .hair, black
jackets, and soiled denims or jeans (the presumed uni
form of ’tough b o y s ’), and boys who in their interac
tions with officers did not manifest what were consider
ed to be appropriate signs of respect tended to receive
the more severe dispositions.
The manner in which control agents sift through a p e r s o n ’s •x'
behavior,

screening out certain acts as unimportant, empha

sizing still others as indicating a p e r s o n ’s ’’real" self,
largely determines the intensity of sanctions and the effec
tiveness of labeling.
The processing of juvenile delinquents is a major arena
for this type of research.

Ironically, juvenile courts,

which were established in the early nineteen-hundreds to
curb the stigmatization of troublesome children (Platt, 1969),
are particularly vulnerable to labeling processes.

Juveniles

can come under the c o u r t ’s jurisdiction for a variety of m i s 
conducts, from ’’incorrigibility" to major criminal offenses,
and once under the c o u r t ’s jurisdiction they are subjected
to a number of "child savers," each using slightly different

informal standards to determine how best to deter any further
delinquency.

The discretion invested in many officials of

the juvenile system, from the policeman to the judge to the
probation official, makes stereotypic responses quite likely.
Cicourel (1968), for example, argues that "appealing and
attractive" delinquents "who want very much to be helped" are
more likely to have their behavior interpreted clinically or
socially than criminally.

Outside of demeanor, the labeling

orientation suggests that ethnicity,

socioeconomic status,

education, age, sex, type of offense and previous record all
influence whether a delinquent will enter the juvenile sys
tem, and once in it, how he will be treated
Sieverdes,

(see Thomas and

1975; Thomas and Cage, 197 5; Thornberry,

1973).

Not all labeling research on the application of labels,
however, has been done on the juvenile system.

Some people

have concerned themselves with more subtle forms of stereo
typing, especially those forms emerging from professional
values or.treatment standards.

For the most part, this type

of research is done, on the mental health system or altruistic
organizations for the handicapped,

in which "experts" are

required to define the degree of deviantness.
1969), for instance,

Scott

(1970;

in researching the "blindness system," .

explains that the general definition of blindness is quite
arbitrary, and that many people classified as blind actually
have some measurable vision.

Consequently,

contact with an

opthamalogist or welfare agent frequently determines whether
a person is treated as someone having difficulty in seeing or
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as a blind person with residual sight.
(1966)

Similarly,

Scheff

notes that psychiatric and judicial hearings on mental

incompetency are largely perfunctory,

since these officials

consider it more dangerous to "judge a sick person well than ^
to judge a well person sick."

In one of S c h e f f fs studies,

although sixty-three percent of the patients did not meet
legal requirements for involuntary status

(they were neither

severely impaired nor d angerous), virtually every hearing
recommended commitment.

In a final example, Rosehan (197 3)

conducted a study in which eight people gained entrance into
different mental hospitals by imitating several psychotic
symptoms during an admission interview.

Immediately on

entrance, they stopped simulating any abnormal symptoms.
In all twelve cases the pseudo-patients had difficulty in
establishing their sanity to the different hospitals's
personnel.

After an average hospitalization of nineteen

days, each was released with the diagnosis "schizophrenia in
remission."

In all three examples, the expectations and

standards of "experts," regardless of their good intentions,
played a crucial part in determining who was deviant and
who was n o t .
To their credit, labeling analysts focus attention on
the processes by which deviants are differentiated from
nondeviants.

Although they underplay some important m a t t e r s ,

such as organizational interests,

stress and pressures, they

highlight the workings of informal stereotypes, especially
as they operate in the juvenile and other therapeutic systems.
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Such stereotypes influence who is likely to be accused,
apprehended and treated as deviant, and the likelihood of
being identified as deviant determines the likelihood of
being successfully labeled as an outsider.

Consequences of L a b el i ng : Becoming a Deviant
It is one thing to commit a deviant act'— eg. acts of
lying, stealing, homosexual intercourse, n ar c ot ic sf
use, drinking to excess, unfair competition.
It is quite
another thing to be charged and invested with a deviant
character, ie. to be socially defined as a liar, a thief,
a homosexual, a dope fiend, a drunk, a chiseler, a
bro w n- no se r, a hoodlum, a sneak, a scab and so on.
It
is to be assigned a role, a special type of category of
persons.
The label— the name of the r o l e— does more
than signify one who has committed such-and-such a
deviant act.
Each label evokes a characteristic imagery.
It suggests someone who is normally or habitually given
to certain kinds of deviance; who is literally a bundle
of odious and sinister qualities.
It activates senti
ments and calls out responses in others: rejection,
contempt, suspicion, withdrawal, fear, hatred.
This passage by Cohen (1966:

24) accurately portrays the

crucial distinction between committing a deviant act and
being invested with a deviant character, which is the basis
of labeling analysis.

The first involves the processes ^

culminating in an act; the second invloves the processes by
which accused deviants are socially differentiated from others.
In a series of important essays on the labeling position,
Lemert

(1967; 1972) proposes the significance of this distinc

tion by pointing out the insufficiency of M e r t o n ^
approach to deviance,

in particular his theory of anomie.

Deviance, Lemert argues,
tions:

structural

suggests two types of research ques

(1) how deviant behavior originates and (2) how deviant

acts are effectively attached to persons,

influencing further
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deviance by that person.

The first, and the.focus of

M e r t o n ’s approach, arises from a variety of sources for a
variety of reasons.

No single theory, then, whether it p r o 

poses ’’strain,” ’’differential opportunity” or some similar
explanation, can possibly capture the a c t ’s etiological com
plexity.

The second, however, at least for Lemert (1951:

75),

is the more understandable and sociologically significant,
for ’’deviations are not significant until they are organized
subjectively and transformed into active social roles and
become the social criteria for assigning status.”

Lemert,

as well as other labeling a n a l y s t s , suggest that consistent ^
deviant behavior results from social labeling, from the p r o 
cesses culminating in commitment to a deviant role.
In this way, Lemert distinguishes between primary and
secondary deviance.

Primary deviance, the deviance that

Merton focuses attention on, arises for a number of social,
cultural, psychological and biological reasons, and at best
it has only minimal effect on a p e r s o n ’s self-concept.
People become alcoholics for a variety of resasons, from the
death of a loved one or business failure, from an intolerance
to alcohol or even from participating in some cultural role
that requires a great deal of drinking.
are made by Scheff

Similar arguments

(1966) in his description of residual

rule breaking and by Becker (1963:

26) in his statement that

’’most people experience deviant impulses frequently.”
dary deviance, however,

Secon

is the organization of deviant behav

ior into a social role, which becomes a means of "defense,
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attack or adaptation"

(Lemert,

1967) to the problems created

by the social reactions directed toward a p e r s o n Ts primary
deviance.

What is explicitly important for Lemert (1967:

17)

in this distinction is that it implies not only a shift in
behavioral patterns but a shift in the "causes" of deviance
as well:

"the original causes of deviation recede and give

way to the central importance of the disapproving, degradational and labeling reactions of society."

In other words,

while the origins of initial deviance are diverse, repeated
deviance or secondary deviance is caused by a commitment to
a miscreant role, which in turn is .caused by official labels.
When taken to extremes, this assertion leads to inevi
table problems for labeling analysts.

While the contention

implies la be li ng Ts explanatory superiority over Merton*s
structural focus, it also runs against an interactionist
position.

Becker (1960:

36) himself,

in an earlier essay

about components of commitment, argues that initial behavior
as well as initial interests are important to consider.
Whenever we propose commitment as an explanation of con
sistency in behavior, we must have independent observa
tions of the major components in such a proposition:
(1) prior actions of the person staking some originally
extraneous interest in his following a consistent line
of activity; (2) a recognition by him of the involvement
of this originally extraneous interest in his present
activity; and (3) the resulting consistent line of
activity.
Essentially,

labeling proponents fall into the same trap that

Cohen C1965) recognizes in structural approaches to deviance:
they assume discontinuity.

In other words, what difference

is there between anomie theory—

deviance portrayed as an
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abrupt change, as a leap from strain to abnormal behavior—
a nd the labeling approach,

in which t h e .original causes of

deviance disappear, abruptly giving way to secondary deviance
with the onslaught of social reactions?

Some of the problem,

of course, could be handled by labeling proponents if they
conceptualized the importance of original mot iv at io ns , inter
ests and structure in their studies, yet, for the most part,
they define away these aspects with the concept of primary
deviance.
Despite this conceptual problem,

labeling analysts right

fully argue the possibility that social reactions push people
into deviant roles,

A study by Jewell

(1962) indicates that

secondary deviance does occur, although not without some im
portant influences prior to labeling.

"Bill," as Jewell

refers to his subject, was a Navajo Indian, who was hospital
ized and diagnosed as schizophrenic without having the usual
psychiatric workup.
tioned in Spanish,

At the initial interview Bill was ques
since he was mistaken for a Mexican.

Bill's failure to respond, however, was interpreted as evidence
of pathology rather than as a language barrier.
he was diagnosed schizophrenic.

Consequently,

Much of Bill's behavior,

Jewell argues, was consistent with traditional Navajo responses
to stressful situations.

Even the grotesque posture Bill dis

played, the waxy flexibility of catatonic schizophrenia,
reflected the Navajo*s traditional deference to the white man
rather than any form of pathology.

When interviewed by Jewell,

Bill explained his posture as complying to what he thought was
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expected of him.

In short, Jewell argues that Bill was

confused by the hospital setting, that he retreated to the
traditional Navajo passivity in the face of threats and that
his responses won him a place in one of the h o s p i t a l ’s
back wards.
A more pure case of secondary deviance is presented
by Lemert (1951; 1967; 1972) in his study of adult stuttering.
Although there has been much research into the possible
physiological and biological causes of stuttering, no satis
factory explanation has been found, which Lemert argues points
to the possibility that stuttering is socially caused.
Accordingly,

Lemert argues that early reactions to c h i ld re n’s

speech, either by family or peers or even speech therapists,
determine whether stuttering persists into later life.

In the

case of speech therapists, children are often required to
talk in front of mirrors or in front of other .children in
order to demonstrate the abnormal movements of a stutt er er ’s
mouth.
(1951:

Despite the t h e r a p i s t ’s benign intentions,

Lemert

159) argues, these efforts result in instilling

"an unequivocal self-definition as one who is different from
others.”

In time, Lemert concludes, the stutterer adopts

more fully this self-definition in order to solve identity
problems posed by interaction, thus entering into secondary
deviance.
This process of becoming a deviant is represented and
more fully elaborated by figure 1.
deviance for a number of reasons.

People engage in primary
If no one reacts negatively
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to the infractions, they would have little or no effect on
p e o p l e Ts perceptions of themselves.

If one of these people,

for one reason or another, is singled out, reacted to nega
tively, then he is faced with a new situation.

If the re ac 

tion is intense, especially if it is the reaction of some

Figure 1: Becoming a Secondary Deviant

PRIMARY DEVIANCE:
Arising from a
variety of things,
of only temporary
and insignificant
importance to a
p e r s o n ’s actual
self-councept

SOCIAL REACTION:
Especially when in
the form of public
reaction, creates
deviant expectations
for interactional
p ro ce ss es .

SECONDARY DEVIANCE:
If the deviant is
unsuccessful, he
enters secondary
deviance, adopting
the role as a means
of solving inter
actional problems.

ROLE ENGULFMENT:
Deviant act is the
most sanguine aspect
in interaction with
others, deviant
attempts to reduce
its importance by
various methods.

public o f f i c i a l , the person is likely to become engulfed by
stereotypic expectations.

Keying on some of B e c k e r ’s and

L e m e r t ’s ideas, Schur (1971) describes role engulfment as
the tendency for deviants to become ’’caught u p ” in deviant
expectations, to find that the initial infraction has become
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a highly salient aspect of how others interact with them.
If the deviant can neutralize the reactions, either by seek
ing support from others or by rationalizing his own behavior,
he returns to a primary category (the pathway represented by
the dotted a r ro w ).

But if the deviant fails to neutralize the

reactions of others, he becomes a secondary deviant, succumb
ing to the expectations of others in order to solve the
problems presented by role engulfment.
How much labeling, how many reactions must occur before
a primary deviant becomes a secondary deviant?

When emphasiz

ing the processual nature of their'model, labeling analysts
argue that secondary deviance seldom occurs over night.
Rather the sequence of interaction involves several instances
of deviance and social reactions.

Lemert

(1951:

77) describes

it as follows:
The sequence of interaction leading to secondary
deviance is roughly as follows: (1) primary deviation;
(2) social penalties; (3) further primary deviation;
(4) stronger penalties and rejection; (5) further
deviations perhaps with hostilities and resentment
beginning to focus upon those doing the penalizing;
(6) crisis reached in the tolerance quotient, expressed
in formal action by the community stigmatizing the
deviant; (7) strengthening of the deviant conduct as
a reaction to the stigmatizing and penalties; (8)
ultimate acceptance of deviant social status and efforts
at adjustment on the basis of the associated role.
Still, while labeling analysts portray a variety of social
reactions leading up to secondary deviance, the crisis in
tolerance, and the entrance of formal control agents is the
crucial point in the labeling process.
labeled,

Once p u b l i c l y /

secondary deviance is only a matter of time.
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Taken t o g e t h e r ,'the previous three sections provide, an
inventory of labeling.

The ideas concerning how rules are

made, how rules are enforced and how that enforcement leads
\

some to define themselves as secondary deviants, are all
components of lab el in gTs most well-known claim:
causes deviance.

social control

In the preface to his essays in Human

D e v i a n c e , Social P r o b l e m s , and Social C o n tr ol , Lemert

(1967;

1972) describes this assertion as "a large turn away from
older sociology which tended to rest heavily upon the idea
that deviance leads to social control.”

For Lemert, as well

as other labeling analysts, previous theories of deviance fail
to see the "forest for the trees;” they seek the causes of
deviance in individual pathology,

in environmental factors

and in subcultural values rather than in the processes by
which some people are socially differentiated from others.
Although previous theorists,
Sutherland (1939:

such as the criminologist

1), noted the importance of the processes

by which people make rules and the processes by which people
react to infractions in understanding deviance, they were
seldom incorporated into theory.

Consequently, labeling,

in

that it describes the relationship between social control and
deviant outcomes, brings the forest into perspective.

But at

what cost to the trees, at what cost to an understanding of
deviant behavior is this accomplished?

CHAPTER II
A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT

The usefulness of any criticism depends on two things:
(1) agreement about what is being criticized and (2) agree-

’o ■

ment about the proper grounds for criticism.
the literature,

Judging from

labeling*s critics do not agree about either

of these matters.

Some theorists focus on particular parts

of labeling, arguing that it is too phenomenological (Rock,
1974) or not phenomenological enough (Warren and Johnson,
1972).

Others are dismayed by label in gTs failure to address

certain traditional questions,

such as the origins of deviance

(Taylor, Walton and Young, 1973), variations in rates of
deviance across populations

(Merton, 1971; Gibbs,

the relativeness of deviance to certain societies
1971; Gibbs, 1966).

seeing it as a scantly disguised

welfare ethic (Gouldner, 1968; Liazos,

1972) as well as a

jaundiced interpretation of social control
1975).

(Merton,

Still others object to labeli ng ’s peculiar

ideological undercurrents,

Manning,

1966), or

Recently,

Lemert

(1974:

(Bordua,

1967;

457) accurately de

scribed the confusion by characterizing the field as ’’...under
attack from so many different quarters, both for what it is
and for what it is not, that a sense of embattlement is in
escapable.

The diverse, perverse, and tangential nature of
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the criticisms makes it difficult to tell friend from foe.”
Undoubtedly, much of the confusion stems from different
interpretations of labeling.

As we have already seen, the

approach is sufficiently loose at certain points to suggest
a variety of readings.

A number of c ontraditions, however,

result from the assorted grounds on which criticism is based,
from the differences in opinion about what a good theory or
a good approach to deviance should accomplish.
Gibbs

For instance,

(1966; 1972), perhaps the most prescient critic of

labeling, consistently objects to the a p p r o a c h Ts failure to
unambiguously distinguish between deviants and nondeviants.
Schur (1971), on the other hand,

suggests that this looseness

is a theoretical strength of labeling rather than a weakness,
for it accurately displays the fluidness of the social world.
Neither individuals nor acts are immutably deviant, he argues,
and any attempt to make such clear-cut conceptual distinctions
is misguided.

G i b b s ’s and S c h u r Ts differences are not analytic,

for both agree that deviance is socially defined, varying across
time and space; their differences are in how best to incorporate
relativism in a conceptual scheme.
According to labeling theorists, deviance is better under
stood as a "sensitizing concept” rather than a definitional
t
or operational term.
Adopting B lu m e r ’s (19 69: 140-15 2) distinc
tion between the two, Schur (19 71) argues that previous theories,
in that they defined deviance in simplistic ei'ther-or terms,
obscured .the social aspects of a miscreant identity.

Acts

construed as deviant according to one set of standards may be
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acceptable or even demanded by another set.

Even when there

Is agreement on standards, a deviant act may constitute only
a small segment of a person's behavior.

Consequently,

Schur

(1971: 15) argues that deviance must always refer ,Tto the set ^
of standards from which (individuals) are said to deviate and
must always be expressed in terms 'of degree, variation and
circumstances, rather than in simplistic
fications."

’eithe r- or ’ classi

This relativeness is best portrayed by a loose,

sensitizing conception of deviant behavior,

in which social

processes and the fluidness of the social order are emphasized.
This position accounts for much of la beling’s popularity.
The social and relative aspects of deviance that labeling
underscores are consistent with several classical traditions,
such as symbolic interactionism, conflict analysis and
phenomenology (see Schur, 1969; 1971).

Moreover,

labeling

also converges with several popular ideas about the origins
of deviance.

The implied irreversibility of labeling, of ^

being a "jail bird" or an "ex-con," coincides with several
cultural themes-- the good kid who made one mistake and was
never allowed to live-it-down.
deviant are tapped, too.
or motorcycle gangs

More current images of the

Interviews with topless barmaids

(see Douglas,

197 0b) portray deviants

as nonconformists who are misunderstood by society.
this gives S c h u r fs argument apparent validity.

All of

The popular

images, the popular themes and the appearance of being anchor
ed in several important sociological traditions suggest label
i n g ’s contribution as an explanatory framework, and the new
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areas of interest, the new subjects for research,

suggest its

value as a heuristic tool.
Certainly, labeling has presented new areas for research,
and to a large extent, it has directed sociology and criminology
back to questions about the social origins of deviance.

In

this sense, S c h u r fs characterization of deviance as a "sensi
tizing concept" is quite right.

But there is an important

difference between suggestiveness and explanation.

The first

often requires a certain looseness; the second always requires
clarity and distinction, qualities labeling clearly lacks.
In an early essay on the general aspects of deviancy theory,
Lemert

(1948:

27) himself notes the explanatory ambiguity of

an interactionist approach.
Interaction is not a theory or explanation at all.
It does little more than set down a condition of inquiry,
telling us that dynamic analysis must supplement struc
tural analysis, and is best understood as a necessary
reaction to the metaphysical explanations of human
behavior current among nineteenth century writers.
A
further reason for rejecting interaction as a theory per
se is that it results in a directionless inquiry ending
in a morass of dog-in-the-mangerish variables, none
of which have priority or provide a formula for
prediction.
While labeling does claim the significance of formal reactions
as explanatory variables,

it fails to clearly define exactly

what such variables explain.

To say it explains deviance, is

to say in their own words that it explains a "sensitizing
concept,"

which is to say very little.

The observations that follow are directed toward labeli ng 1s
lack of conceptual clarity and empirical usefulness,
ring of the trees for the sake of the forest.

its blur

While labeling
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theorists suggest the importance of social processes in pro
ducing deviant outcomes, they do not specify exactly what those
processes are beyond the most general and rhethorical terms.
Categories like "overdog" and "underdog" do not imply any
understanding of interest groups or the ways in which diverse
interests organize into powerful coalitions.

Nor does stating

that social control causes deviance explain how those outcomes
occur0

While ideas like labeling, process,

social definitions

and social interaction are highly suggestive, they are not
developed by labeling analysts,, at least not in any way that
would benefit meaningful inquiry.

Consequently,

labeling1s

conceptual ambiguity is often reflected by the bewilderment
of sociologists and criminologists to empirically understand
its i d e a s .

The Conceptual Forest
In several articles, Gibbs

(1966; 1972) points out the

inherent tensions that exist in labeling between a normative
and a reactional conception of deviance.

When labeling theo

rists adhere strictly to a reactional conception,
ments are relative in the extreme.

their state

In other words, there

can be no expectation of consistency in either the incidence
of deviant behavior or in the negative reactions of others,
since each situation with its unique circumstances determines
whether or not an act is dev i an t0

As Gibbs notes, this is a

major shift from a traditional sociological and criminological
interest in changing rates of deviance.

By conceiving deviance
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solely in terms of reactions,

labeling analysts provide no in

sight into Why different rates of deviance occur in different
populations.

Even if two populations have the same definition

of deviance and react to deviance in the same manner with the
same consistency,

it is possible that one population may have

a higher rate of deviancy than the other.
As a result, labeling theorists have not completely
neglected a normative conception,
definition seems too unconvincing.
(1951;

1967),

implying it when a reactional
For instance,

Lemert

in his own distinction between primary and

secondary deviance,

implies some concensus about what is

’’potentially” deviant.

Again, both B e c k e r ’s (196 3) suggestion

of ’’secret deviance” and L o r b e r ’s (1967) description of
self-typing denotes some agreement about what is likely to get
a person into trouble.

With regard to self-typing,

if a per

son anticipates social reaction, defining himself as deviant
when no actual reaction occurs,

it implies some prior know

ledge of what the community considers right and wrong.

The

very idea of ’’patterned” social reactions, whether it be in
biases toward t h e lower-classes or in situations that demand
responses, suggests normative agreement on the part of at
least policemen, judges and other officials.

Just as people

tend to share some beliefs about what forms of behavior are
appropriate, Gibbs and Clark (1965) argue, they share beliefs
about what forms of reaction are necessitated by certain forms
of,mi s co nd uc t.
In part, l a b el in grs suggestion of normative agreement

results from its failure to explain why and how a label,
whether it be official or not, identifies an act as deviant.
If two boys steal some money from a grocery store and only
one is caught, the one caught by the police obviously faces
different consequences than the one who got away.

Does that

mean that the boy who was caught committed a deviant act and
the boy who got away did not?
labeling says yes—

A strict interpretation of

but the grocery store owner, the boy who

got away and even the boy who got caught are likely to think
differently.

As Gibbs

(19 66) has pointed out, if the labeling

theorists are right, then the solution to crime is well within ^
our reach—

close down the courts, close down the police sta

tions, close down the mental hospitals.

If there is no reaction,

there is no deviance.
Schur (1971) is correct in arguing that critics have
tended to overstate label in g 1s ambiguities with regard to its
treatment of deviant acts and deviant persons.

Labeling

theorists do not deny the reality of deviance, as it is some
times suggested.

No one really argues that behavior such as

rape, homicide, mental illness or robbery would disappear if
it was not reacted to by someone.

Schur (1971), furthermore,

is correct when he argues that labeling theorists are fully
aware that acts of deviance, for the most part, accompany*^
social reactions in producing deviant outcomes.

L ab eling’s if

focus on social reactions is meant to highlight what is socially
made of a.n act;

it does not mean that reactions are necessary

conditions of deviance.

But what Schur, as well as most label-

ing theorists , fails to understand is that by banishing the
normative conception of deviance from their approach, they
also banish any possibility of understanding the discrepency
between infractions and reactions, which rests at the heart
of l ab eling’s appeal.

If each situation dictates deviance,

each cluster of circumstances dictates the likelihood of
reactions, there can be no understanding of why certain acts
together are reacted to differently than others.
question remains unanswered by labeling.
shadow in their writings,

This

It lingers like a

suggesting an explanatory analysis,

but it is never permitted to enter as a focus in its own
right.

By conceiving deviance as entailing reactions,

label

ing theorists define away the discrepency between reactions
and infractions instead of explaining it.
Setting aside the discrepency revolving around the deviant
act, additional problems are encountered with regard to deviant
identities or secondary deviance.

Lemert

(1967:

18), to recall,

contends that "a distinction between primary and secondary
deviation is deemed indispensable to a complete understanding
of deviation in modern pluralistic society.”

The former

involves behavior, which although deviant, carries little or
no consequences for an i n di vidual’s future behavior; the latter
involves behavior that is organized into a deviant role, that
an individual is committed to as a way of life.

Furthermore,

Lemert, like other labeling theorists, contends that the causes
of secondary deviance are different from the causes of primary
deviance.

While the distinction between commitment to behavior
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is possible,

it is difficult to make clear causal distinctions

between the two forms of deviance.

Implicit in the approach

is an attempt to explain secondary deviance or "hard-core"
deviance as resulting from labeling (Taylor, Walton and Young,
1973).

But it is not clear how the original causes of deviance

give way to the coercive effects of social reactions.
Indeed it is possible to describe deviants who never
come to the attention of social control agents and still per
sistently commit deviant acts.

Becker

(196 3: 41) himself

argues that "an u n k n o w n , but probably quite large number of
people in the United States use marijuana."

Obviously, all

of these people have not been labeled "marijuana smokers" by
officials,

school administrators or the police;

if they had,

it is unlikely that the jails would have any room.
Reiss

Again,

(1970), in a study on premarital sex, notes that few

adolescents are ever caught engaging in sexual intercourse.
(The Kinsey report recorded only six discoveries out of every
one-hundred thousand reported acts of intercourse.)

Yet a

quite larger number, Reiss suggests, adopt deviant sexual
careers.

As Akers

(1968:

463) pointedly argues,

does not create the behavior in the first place.

"the label
People can

and do commit deviant acts because of the particular contin
gencies and circumstances in their lives, quite apart from or
in combination with the labels others apply to them."

Com

mitment to deviance often exists outside of any contact with
social control agencies.
Admittedly, la b e l i n g ’s emphasis on processes provides a
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partial solution to distinguishing the causes of primary
from secondary deviance.

To the extent that "degrees of

deviance" are identified,

it might be argued that continued

deviance after social reactions requires more commitment on
the part of miscreants.

Thus the marijuana smoker who gets

caught is more committed to a deviant identity than someone who
smokes marijuana but has never been labeled as such.

Never-V""

theless, prior conditions, prior "degrees of deviance" would
still be important factors in explaining the effects of social
reactions.

If the labeling approach was consistent about a

processual explanation of misconduct,

it would have to talk

about "degrees" of primary and secondary deviance, which would
render the original distinction useless.
Rather than forfeit the distinction, labeling theorists
usually describe a more truncated version of the "process"
by which people become career miscreants.

For the most part,

they emphasize the stigmatizing, compelling impact of o f f i c i a l 4^
reactions, obscuring the influence of intial factors in caus
ing secondary deviance.

In this fashion, they locate the fate

and very development of deviants in the reactions of social
control agents

(Bordua, 19 67).

This exaggeration leaves the

impression that individuals are drifters one day and career
deviants the next.

Akers (19 68: 46) accurately describes

this truncated labeling process.
One sometimes gets the impression from reading this
literature that people go about minding their own
business, and then— "wham"-- bad society comes along
and slaps them with a stigmatized label.
Forced into
the role of deviant the individual has no choice but
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to be deviant.
This is an exaggeration of course, but
such an image can be gained easily from an over-emphasis
on the impact of labeling.
Such an impression also suggests an odd interpretation of
modernity by Lemert and other labeling theorists.

By portray

ing secondary deviance as resulting solely from labeling, they
attribute to the reactions of social control agents the
forces of primitive taboos.
The "penetrating," "debunking" quality of labeling that
has won it so much popular acclaim, rests on this misleading
causal distinction between secondary and primary deviance.
Primary deviants are supposedly like anyone else, engaging in
some deviance, but not to "excess."

They cannot be blamed

for their misbehavior,

(19 67:

for as Lemert

51) argues,

"while

some fortunate individuals by insightful endowment or by
virtue of the stabilized nature of their situations can fore
see more distant social consequences of their actions and
behave accordingly, not so most people."

Secondary deviants,

in that they are recruited from this blameless body of people,
are thus the unfortunate ones, the unlucky ones who did not
get away.

For instance, one implication of Schefffs

(1966)

study is that people who are not "really" mentally ill get
categorized as such because of the eccentricity of official
procedures.

While this may sometimes be the case,

Scheff

never provides a means of distinguishing between those who
are "really" mentally ill and those who are not.

Consequently,

in many labeling studies it is hard to distinguish between
what is "penetrating" and mere conceptualization.

■

■

45
As with deviant acts, there is some discrepency between
what labeling theorists argue and what they imply.
they do portray deviance in a processual manner.

At times
In these

i nstances, their own studies often disprove that secondary
deviance results solely from labeling.

For instance, in the

O u t s i d e r s , Becker (1953) describes the events in which a
person becomes a "marijuana smoker."

Ironically, it is the

lack of social reaction that Becker (1963:

70-71) finds as

influencing a p e r s o n 1s involvement in a deviant career.
(Were you making it much at first?)
No, not too much.
Like I said, I was a little afraid of it.
But it was
finally about 194 8 that I really began to make it strong.
(What were you afraid of?)
Well, I. was afraid that I
would get too high and not be able to ’o p 1 , you dig,
I mean I was afraid I would get too high, and pass out
completely, or do stupid things.
I d i d n ’t want to get
too wigged.
(How did you ever get over that?)
Well,
i t ’s just one of those things, man.
One night I turned
on and -I just suddenly felt real great, you know, I was
really swinging with it.
From then on I have just been
able to smoke as much as I want without getting into
any trouble about it.
I can always control it.
From the passage it is obvious the respondent was aware of
the consequences of being too "wigged."
own implications the act is deviant,

And from B e c k e r ’s

since he describes it

as basically disapproved of and illegal.

But it is not social

reaction but the lack of it that influenced further deviance.
B e c k e r ’s respondent, when he found he could handle the drug
in public places without being discovered,

"really began to

make it stro ng ."

Undoubtedly, labeling theorists do not believe that there
is no normative agreement in modern society or that public
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labeling is the only cause of secondary deviance.

For the

most p a r t 5 many of the critical arguments presented here have
been based on exaggerations of the labeling position.
labeling theorists,

But

insofar as they fail to consider normative

agreement, fail to describe the influence of initial causes
and fail to clearly explain the circumstances in which label
ing leads to miscreant careers,

invite these exaggerations.

Although most of the difficulties could be worked out, it
would be at the cost of the a p p r oa ch ’s causal distinctions
and its popular acclaim as a ’’debunking" perspective.

The

processual model would have to be more clearly specified,

in

terms of what kind of reactions, by whom, to what kind of
deviance,

in what kind of situations, before l ab eling’s claims

about the impact of social reactions could be fully assessed.
In short, the forest would have to be put in proper perspec
tive to the trees.

The Empirical Forest
As expected, the general looseness and ambiguity of
labeling has directly affected the quality and type of research
that usually appears in the literature.
clear.

The problems are

Schur (1971), for instance, describes labeling as con

centrating on "degrees of deviantness" that result from
s o m eo ne ’s efforts to "do something about" illicit behavior.
While labeling theorists are in some agreement that "doing
something about" behavior means official reactions, how much
reaction equals how many "degrees of deviantness?"

Traffic
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violations are something that most communities feel a need
to do something about, yet is the reaction toward a speeder
equal to the reaction toward a bank robber or an environ
mental infraction?

Which is more deviant?

While a rough

continuum is conceivable, one with fairly large categories
equating certain kinds and frequencies of reactions to specific
degrees of deviance,

labeling theorists have never developed

one *
To a certain extent, the problem rests in different
research expectations.

While previous theories of deviance

have been designed to accomodate quantitative techniques,
labeling is directed more toward qualitative methods.

Label

ing analysis concetrates on matters that are difficult, if not
impossible, to quantify: the development of a deviant identity,/
the elaboration of deviant careers and roles, the interactional
process between deviants and nondeviants.

Even with regard

to the causes of individual deviance, the labeling approach
emphasizes processual contingencies that are too elaborate
for quantification.

This point has been made by Cohen (1966:

43), who suggests that the interactional process leading to a
deviant act is best portrayed as a "tree."
The completed pathway—

A, AA, A A A —

(see figure 2)

represented by a solid

line is the course of action, according to Cohen, that leads
to a deviant outcome.

The other pathways, represented with

broken lines, are the other courses that action could take.
As Cohen argues, pathways are not predictable from initial
states or acts alone; prediction is contingent on the situa-
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tion following each move.

Using an interactionist perspec

tive, then, each pathway is an important possibility and each
junction represents an important decision-making process.

.

Figure 2: Interaction Process and Deviant Outcomes

AAA
AA

AB

ABA

ABB

BAA
BA
BAB
BB

BBA
BBB

Within the labeling framework, the interactional process
leading to a deviant identity is just as difficult to quanti
tatively verify.

Reconsider point AAA as secondary deviance,

a deviant role and not just a deviant act.

Moreover, recon

sider each junction of lines to be a point in time at which
A or B is socially sanctioned, receiving .an official social
reaction.

The pathway A — A A — AAA is the most pure example

of an individual’s movement into secondary deviance.

Provid-
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ing some referent of behavior and self-concept could be deriv
ed, a movement into secondary deviance could be quantitatively
verified by measuring the effects of sanctioning.

Now con

sider the other pathway, particularly the pathway B— BB--BBB.
Using the same referents as before, or any other referents
for that matter, B's movement cannot be said to disprove the
labeling position, for there is no reason to believe that
additional reactions,

if the graph were extended, would not

move B more in the direction of secondary deviance.
provides no time limitations.

Labeling

As Tittle (197 5) recently

argues, according to the labeling framework, the presumed
effects can be considered an extension of the labeling process
itself.

The lack of time boundaries, then, makes labeling dif

ficult to prove and almost impossible to disprove, a respondent's
death being the only real boundary.
Consequently, most of the evidence for labeling has been
taken from qualitative research, yet there are some real prob
lems in interpreting these studies.

As a rule, the evidence

is a barrage of quotes which supposedly document the effects
of labeling.

The following passage from Goffman's

(196 3: 16)

Stigma is an example.
Whenever I fell, out swarmed the women in droves, cluck
ing and fretting like a bunch of bereft mother hens.
It
was kind of them, and in retrospect, I appreciate their
solicitude, but at the time I resented and was greatly
embarrassed by their inference.
For they assumed that no
routine hazard of skating-— no stick or stone— upset my
flying wheels.
It was a- foregone conclusion that I fell
because I was a poor helpless cripple.
Not^one of them
shouted with outrage, "That dangerous wild bronco threw
h e r 2"— which, God forgive, he did technically.
It was
like a horrible ghostly visitation of my roller-skating
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days.
All the good people lamenting in-chorus,
poor, poor girl fell off!"

"That

It is obvious that the girl dreads the condescending reactions
of others to her handicap.

There is no reason, however, to

infer from the passage that such reactions have compelled her
to accept a social role as a cripple.
are indicated by the passage.

No changes in behavior

Indeed, the passage can only

prove that cripples sometimes receive stereotyped reactions
and that they do not like it.
Even when qualitative research does indicate behavioral
changes,

it is sometimes hard to tell whether the changes re

present secondary deviance or not.

For instance, Scott (19 69),

developing some of Goffman's ideas, describes five ways in
which the blind manage stigmatization.

The first, the "true

believer," concurs both behaviorally and subjectively with the
stereotypes presented by sighted people.

Other blind persons,

however, manage to insulate part of their self image from the
assaults made by normals; these people conform behaviorally
but define themselves subjectively as different from other
blind persons.

A third adaptation involves deliberately

assuming a facade of compliance in order to ease interactional
problems that are caused by stereotypes.
the facade for profit.

Blind beggars, who literally exact a

price for their compliance,
Finally,

Still others adopt

Scott places in this category.

some blind persons actively resist the stereotypes.

Which of these five adaptations, according to labeling,
secondary deviance?

is

The first type clearly is, but the remain

ing four are not so easily described as examples of secondary

deviance.

Of course, labeling theorists could a r g u e , as

Scott largely does, that the five adaptations are "degrees
of career deviance."

Still, S c o t t Ts descriptions portray

some blind persons as having more control over their situa
tions than originally described by Lemert.
Quantitative research also presents some interpretive
problems.

Recidivism, for e x a m p l e , is often assumed to be the '

most likely measure of secondary deviance, yet meaningful
rates of reoccurring criminality are hard to obtain.
(1975 ) argues, rearrest is a poor indicator,

As Tittle

since known ^

delinquents and ex-convicts are more likely to be arrested
independent of actual criminal behavior.

Even if conviction S

rates are used, they may represent something entirely different
from career deviance.

These rates include parole violations )/

of an uncriminal type,

such as unmarried cohabitation or

leaving a certain area without permission.
tion indicates further deviance,

Even when convic

it is questionable whether

those rates represent secondary deviance.

Does conviction for

a gambling offense provide evidence of career deviance for
someone initially convicted of armed robbery?

Again, this is

a problem of unspecified "degrees of deviance."
Aware of these problems,

some researchers suggest measur

ing changes in subjective states as a test of labeling.
jective behavioral measures,"

Meade

(19 74:

88) argues,

"ob
"either

in the form of official records or self-report responses,

lack

the sensitivity required for valid testing of the labeling
process."

Unfortunately, there are problems in interpreting
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subjective measures as well.

In part, the problem is the

same as that with qualitative studies using personal reflec
tions:

changes in behavior or in self-concept cannot be in

ferred simply from subjective moods.

While it could be argued

that permanent changes in subjective states would measure the
impact of labeling, such an experiment would require time
series data, which most quantitative studies fail to obtain.
A study by Gibbs
series data.

(19 74) demonstrates clearly the need for time

While he found delinquents to have low feelings

of s e l f “worth prior to court dispositions,

their subjective

mood was comparable with nondelinquents after the judge had
made his decision.

Accordingly,

if studies do not obtain time

series data, not even the failure of deviants to record feel
ings of stigma can be used as proof that labeling does not
occur.

While many researchers have documented a lack of stig

matization among mental patients and delinquents

(see Foster,

Dinitz and Reckless,

1974; Freeman

and Simmons,

1972; 0 TConnor,

1970; Kirk,

1961), their findings can only be interpreted

as inconclusive.
Perhaps the most interesting efforts to quantitatively
measure labeling are the studies of deterrence.
several theorists

(see Thorsell and Klemke,

Recently,

1972; Tittle,

19 75) have noted the similarity between labeling and the much
older deterrence perspective.

Both are interested in how and

why certain groups respond to particular behavior, and both
are interested in the effects of those responses
The major difference, of course,

(Tittle,

is the prediction of the

1975).
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effects of sanctioning, the deterrence model suggesting that
people are repelled from deviance by official reactions.
Chambliss

(1966), for instance, found parking violations to

decrease as punishment became more certain and severe.

Similar

ly, in a study of shoplifting, Cameron (19 64) found nonprofes
sional "snitches” to refrain from stealing after they were
apprehended for the first time, being caught and compelled to
admit they were "thieves" or "criminals" proved too discordant
with their self images as housewives and good citizens.

Other

Studies of deterrence, especially those controlling for certain
ty and severity of punishment, have documented similar findings
(see Schwartz, 19 69; Waldo and Chirico, 1972; Tittle and Rowe,
1974).

While these studies do not disprove labeling, they do

suggest that the effects of official reactions are more complex
than labeling theorists usually imply.
Besides the effects of social reactions,

some of labeling's

other claims present empirical problems for research.

In pa r

ticular, the studies investigating the application of labels
by official control agents, especially when taken together,
are difficult to interpret.
study, Gove (1970a;

In two critiques of Scheff's

(1966)

1970b) argues that behavioral factors,

other than those implied by stereotypes, are crucial in deter
mining who is admitted into mental hospitals.
studies

(see Mendal and Rapport,

1969; Bittner,

He lists several
19 67b) that

report public officials process only those whose behavior has
become too serious, too troublesome to the community.

The

evidence, according to Gove, is that the vast majority of
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persons admitted to mental hospitals do have some .’’real
disturbance.”

Studies in the area of juvenile delinquency

have produced an equal amount of conflicting evidence.
their review of the literature, Thomas and Sieverdes

In

(1975:

416) go so far as to say, ’’even a superficial review of the
relevant literature leaves one with the rather uncomfortable
feeling that the only consistent finding of prior research is
that there are no consistencies in the determinants of the
decision-making process."
Terry, 1967; Pawlak,

(see Goldman,

197 3; Arnold,

1969; Wilson,

1968;

19 71)

Several reasons for these inconsistencies have been sug
gested.

Bordua (1967) argues that some discrepency can be

accounted for by different levels involved in processing
deviants.

The policeman on his beat, the intake officer m a k 

ing decisions and the judge in his courtroom all face different
situations with different interests.
suggest another explanation:

Thomas and Cage (197 5)

inconsistencies result from the

different ways researchers operationalize l a b e li ng ’s concepts.
Since labeling theorists never specify the "degrees of reaction"
they have in mind, different measures are quite likely.

But

this inconsistency makes it almost impossible to relate the
findings of one study to another.

In other words, are stereo

types in probation referrals equivalent to stereotypes in
commitment decisions, or is selectiveness in the juveniles
picked up by police the same as selectiveness in those that
are adjudicated?

Still another explanation is that differences

in social control agencies greatly influences the manner in
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which labels are applied.

Gove (1970a; 1970b)

suggests that

some of S c h ef ffs claims are likely to occur in older mental
institutions.

With regard to juvenile delinquency, Wilson

(19 68) argues that stereotypes are more likely in the arrests
of traditional police departments than in professional ones.
Empirically, the labeling approach is somewhat of a night
mare.

Whether using qualitative or quantitative techniques,

the approach fails to specify what measures are appropriate
or even what boundaries are proper on the time it takes for
a ’’conversion." ' As Lemert

(1951:

74-) originally described it,

movement into secondary deviance may be gradual or ’’self-defi
nitions or self-realizations
perceptions."

(may) be the result of sudden

While there have been some quantitative studies

suggesting deviant outcomes from labeling (see Ageton and
Elliot,

1974; Williams and Gold, 1972), the difficulty of

operationalizing measures makes it hard to access their
importance.

Most of the suggestive studies have been quali

tative, yet with few exceptions they have also been unsystem
atic, making their finding inconclusive.

Davis

(1972:

457-458)

tersely describes this aspect of labeling research as suffer
ing from a "methodological inhibition in which conceptual
impoverishment is facilitated by an absorption with general
imagery, with unsystematic,

elusive, and suggestive empirical

presentations, rather than definitive tests of an interaction
framework."

The same could be said of labeling*s research

into the application of labels.

Qualitative research,

such

as C i co ur el ’s (19 68) or Piliavin*s and B r i a r fs (19 64), suggest
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the workings of official stereotypes, yet more systematic
quantitative efforts reveal a much more complex picture,

in

fluenced by levels of organization and kinds of social reac
tions.

In both instances, labeling fails to specify its key

concepts enough to clear up the empirical confusion.

What can be said of labeling?

Certainly it brought

the forest, brought an emphasis on social processes,
approach.

into its

But emphasizing what is socially made of an act or

person and providing the framework for understanding these
things are two different matters.
the other conceptual depth.

The one involves rhetoric,

Labeling, for the most part,

seems more rhetorical than lucid.

Rather than develop some

of the issues it raised about earlier theories,

like the

difference between normative and reactional conceptions of
d e v i a n c e , it defined the issue away.

Rather than develop the

circumstances under which people might become secondary de
viants or attempt to explain why some people never become
secondary deviants, labeling theorists defined the exceptions
away.
trees.

Labeling brought in the forest, but it obscured the
Undoubtedly, the idea of secondary deviance, the

differential selection and application of labels to deviants,
and the issues of normative and reactional discrepency can all
be clarified, developed and tested.

But in order to do so

some of labeling*s more cherished claims will have to be for
feited, and a fresh look will have to be taken at the forest
once again.

CHAPTER III
SOME NOTES ON DEVIANCE IN MODERN SOCIETIES

Pointing out labeli ng Ts conceptual confusion is not the
same as pointing out its conceptual uselessness.
is the prize of science,

it is not the only goal.

While clarity
On occas-

sion more can be learned from an obscure approach and the
reasons for its obscurity than from the most precisely stated
theories.

Loose ends sometimes provide a means by which to

unravel the most complicated ideas or a means by which to. at
least distinguish some of an i d e a ^ major strands.

Labeling,

with its focus on what is socially made of an act, provides
such an occassion.
Despite some eighty years of research,

sociologists and

criminologists are still puzzled about what precisely is
deviant behavior.

Although theorists traditionally define

deviance as a normative transgression, many rightfully argue
that this conception deceptively implies a clear distinction
between deviant acts and conforming ones.
years ago, Simmons

For instance,

some

(196 9) conducted a study in which he asked

180 people to indicate what behavior they considered to be
deviant.

His respondents listed over one thousand examples

of miscreant behavior , ranging from wearing a. beard and "going
straight" to homosexuality and murder.
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S i m mo nrs research
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clearly demonstrates that almost any act is deviant in the
eyes of someone, but in whose eyes are sociologists to view
deviant behavior?
Even if it is argued, as many sociologists do, that de
viance is the transgression of iriajor rules, of widespread
cultural standards, a normative definition is still mislead
ingly straightforward.

For one thing, many theorists question

whether any broad cultural norms can be identified in modern
societies, or whether they exist only within subcultures and
smaller collectivities.

Even with regard to codified norms

or the law, people disagree significantly about when a law
applies or whether it should be applied at all.

Then too,

some sociologists argue that norms are best visualized as
flexible rules and elastic standards, applying to only certain
situations, at certain times and to certain people.

Even a

m o m e n t ’s reflection suggests a great many examples that occur
in modern societies.

If the actions of people do not always

match the community standards to which they give verbal allegience, are all normative infractions to be considered deviant
behavior?
In recent years, labeling theorists have unraveled some
major strands of deviance.

Their emphasis on the social defi

nition of situations, on the manner in which people negotiate
or fail to negotiate the moral meanings of their a c t i o n s , hi gh 
lights the flexibility of norms in modern communities.
sense, labeling theorists

CErikson, 19 66; Douglas,

In this

19 70a) have

described the study of deviance as the analysis of the construe
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tion and reaffirmation of moral meanings in everyday life.
As an aspect of moral negotiation in modern societies, label
ing highlights the role social reactions, varying both in
intensity and form, play in arbitrating definitions of deviance.
By including less aberrant forms of deviance,

such as the

mentally ill, the handicapped and the blind, labeling analysts
portray the different forms reactions take in modern communi
ties, and concomitantly the different consequences reactions
create in defining situations.

But the final arbitrator of

^

deviance for labeling is the official social control mechanism.
In this sense,

labeling theorists describe social control as «/

the mechanism by which modern communities deal with moral am
biguity:

it labels certain forms of behavior as unacceptable;

it interprets the point at which "something must be done;" it
provides a class of
d ecision-making.

O u t s i d e r s T as referents for less official

With these strands,

labeling attempts to

weave an inherently modern conception of deviant behavior.
Some of the reasons why labeling fails to elaborate these
insights, fails to follow through with these strands, have
already been shown.

For the most part, the reasons presented

in the previous section represent lab e li ng fs unique failures,
unique conceptual and empirical problems.

There is at least

one other reason, however, and this it shares with many theories
of deviance:

it fails to distinguish social types of deviance.

Although Schur C19 71) and others describe deviance as a
"sensitizing concept," encompassing "degrees" of social dis
approval, they never suggest a manner in which these "degrees"
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might be seen as types.

Rather they leave the discomforting

impression of building a ’’thermometer of deviance,” by which
each degree of deviance can be seen to correspond to a degree
of reaction, and the social boiling point represents the en
trance of official control agents.

It is an odd impression

for an approach that rejects a great deal of quantitative re
search because it presumably neglects to understand the sub
jective meanings attached to forms of deviant behavior.
While there are a great many types used in both sociology
and criminology (see Clinard and Quinney,

1973), few are de

veloped in a manner consistent with la b el in g’s concern for the
social meanings of deviant behavior.

A majority of constructs

are empirical typologies, developed by correlating different
behavioral,

legal ana social variables in order to identify

property space.

Still other typologies are developed around

the social contexts in which deviance occurs
Dunham, 19 41; Gibbons,

(Lindesmith and

19 65) or the behavioral systems in which

crime occurs (Clinard and Quinney,

1973).

A few attempts at

conceptual grouping have been applied to inmate cultures
(Irwin and Cressey,

19 64; Schrag,

19 66).

Perhaps the typology

most consistent with l a be li ng ’s focus is one developed by
Cavan

(1962), in which principal consideration is given to

public reaction and the cr i m i n a l ’s reaction to the public.
C a v a n ’s analysis of interaction between criminals and the public
produced seven types of deviant behavior, ranging from criminal
contraculture to minor overconformity to ideological contraculture.

Although C a v a n ’s typology, as well as some of the
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o t h e r s , provide some insights into the different social
dimensions of deviance,

it is not developed to distinguish

social meanings attached to deviant behavior.
In the pages that follow, four ideal types of deviance
will be constructed.

Keeping with l a b e li n g’s focus, the types

will be developed using kinds of reactions,

consequences of

reactions and the social meanings appropriate to each.

A

quick review of the literature suggests agreement about four
distinct areas of research, each with distinct social defini
tions:

Cl) respectable,

(4) dissident deviance.

(2) involuntary,

(3) aberrant and

While there is general agreement that

these areas can be distinguished, their conversion into ideal
types and the manner in which they then should be used is like
ly to be more controversial.

Some years ago, Weber (1949:

49-112) described ideal types as the conceptual strategy of
the social sciences; today few sociologists consciously use
the technique, considering it too impressionistic and empiri
cally rootless

(Sjoberg and Nett,

1968).

Consequently, a brief

explanation of W e b e r ’s contention and the current misunderstand
ing about ideal types is in order before turning to the
development of the constructs.

The Logic of Ideal Types
Some current misunderstanding about ideal types stem from
W e b e r ’s own presentation of the technique.

In a series of

important essays about methodology in the social sciences,
Weber (1949:

93) makes several clear statements about what is
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not an ideal type: they cannot be defined by ’’genus proximum’’
or ’’differentia specifica;’’ they are not hypotheses to be
tested or categories under which concrete examples can be sub
sumed.

In other words,

ideal types are not averages or

natural classifications of social variables, and thus they
cannot be empirically verified.

But when it comes to describ

ing precisely what is an ideal type, Weber is considerably
less clear, relying on metaphors to make his point.
An ideal type is formed by the one-sided accentuation
of one or more points of view and by the synthesis of
a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present
and occassionally absent concrete individual phenomena,
which are arranged according to those one-sidedly
emphasized viewpoints into a unified analytic construct.
. It cannot be found empirically anywhere in reality.
It is a utopia.
Unfortunately, this passage provides little additional under
standing of what is an ideal type, since metaphors are hard
to pin down.

Consequently,

interpretations of W e b e r ’s presen

tation have tended to rest on his negative statements.

But as

any logician will argue, negative definitions provide innumer
able opportunities for misinterpretation.
Not surprisingly,

several misconceptions about ideal

types are held by many sociologists and criminologists.

For

one, some theorists argue that W e b e r ’s constructs are unlikely
to be useful,

since they are both impressionistic and empiri

cally rootless.

After all, how does someone test a utopia?

For Weber, of course, you do not, at least not in the sense of
a hypothesis to be proven or disproven by empirical facts.
But this does not mean that Weber saw ideal types as empirically

rootless or as unverifiable.
of ideal types

Judging from W e b e r ’s own use

Csee Bendix, 1962), it is possible to use these

constructs to describe ’’adequate causal relations” (Weber,
1949:

80) of historical events, such as I n d i a ’s caste system

or the development of American capitalism.
accomplish this, Weber argues,
’’meaningful” traits—

In order to

ideal types must be based on

that is, they must capture the idea

behind certain social acts; he referred to this aspect of
ideal types as ’’general empirical r u le s” that reflect the way
in which men and women are likely to behave in certain situ
ations.

Consequently,

ideal types can be verified.

To the

extent that they capture ideas of practical significance, they
will have logical significance for social scientists.

In this

sense, the validity of an ideal type rests not on its empiri
cal replication, but on the extent to which it can guide in
vestigations,

suggest adequate causal relationships and lead

to more precise understanding of the social world.
Still another misconception revolves around using ideal
types as typologies
1969).

(see Clinard and Quinney,

In an essay on methodology, Wood

197 3; Wood,

(19 69: 239) argues

that ideal types must satisfy the requirements of any t y p o l o g y :
” (1) Are the assumptions regarding the theoretical links b e 
tween variables of the type capable of being tested empirically
(2) Does the classification of cases by the typology lead to
more convincing demonstrations of their explanation?”
reading of Weber, however,
be seen as typologies.

A close

suggests that ideal types cannot

For one, typologies are matrices

6i+
composed of several different dimensions of equal conceptual
importance.

By classifying cases into various cells of the

matrix, relationships between the original dimensions can be
discovered.

Ideal types, however, are constructed by accent

ing a single dimension which in itself suggests an ”objectively
p ossible” causal relationship

(Weber,

19M-9: 92).

Furthermore,

the function of an ideal type is not to provide a scheme for
classification, but to provide'an ideal construct with which
to elaborate significant components of social phenomena.

In

other words, research faces the task of determining the extent
to which these constructs reflect reality—

the extent, for

instance, the economic organization of a city can be viewed
as a ”city-economy" or the domination of a state can be seen
as ’’legal-rational."

While both ideal types and typologies

are essentially heuristic devices, the logical significance
of ideal constructs rests in its ability to elaborate dissim
ilarities as well as similarities with social phenomena.
The previous paragraph provides the elements with which
to make a positive description of ideal types.

Ideal types,

according to Weber, are neither empirically rootless nor
typologies with which to classify social phenomena.

Instead

they are interpretive schemes based on patterns of behavior
that suggest ’’subjectively meaningful” relations between
different aspects of social phenomena.

In this manner,

ideal

types are bo t h heuristic tools and the basis for theoretical
construction.

On the one hand, they provide an ideal,

a limit

ing construct to compare with and thus survey the significant
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components of social'relations; on the other hand, by focus
ing on values and motivations of practical significance,
they suggest adequate causal relations between social phenom
ena.

In this fashion, the final judge of any ideal type

is its utility in understanding the social world.
To illustrate, Hempel

(1963) argues that these aspects

of ideal types can accurately be compared’ to theories of
natural sciences, particularly those found in physics.

In

the natural sciences, Hempel explains, a unique event is
accounted for by the prior or concomitant occurrence of
several variables in an ideal situation.
gravity,

G a l i l e o ’s law of

for instance, argues that objects of equal density

fall at e q u a l .velocities in a vacuum.

By this relationship,

Galileo suggests several variables important in understanding
the effects of gravity.

Similarly, with regard to charismatic

domination, Weber outlines the variables pertinent to under
standing authority based on the "extraordinary qualities of
a leader"

(see Bendix,

1962:

298-328).

When taken together,

these variables describe a cause.of domination in an ideal
situation.

In this sense, W e b e r ’s explanation of charismatic

leadership, like G a l i l e o ’s law of gravity, provides a point
of comparison with which to interpret reality.

Accordingly,

Weber uses this ideal type to explicate the manner in which
C h r i s t ’s personal charisma was institutionalized in the
Catholic Church of the Holy Roman Empire.

The value of ideal

types, like the value of many laws in physics, rests in heuristic
and interpretive potential.
*

Ideal types are particularly amenable to the issues
characteristic of the labeling approach.
on definitions of situations,

Both share a focus

on subjective meanings attached

to behavior and both suggest causal relationships revolving
around those meanings.

Furthermore,

ideal types are essential

ly heuristic devices to be used for conceptual elaboration.
In a passage that could serve as an insight for labeling
analysts, Weber (194-9: 10 2) makes this quite clear.
In the interest of the concrete demonstration of an
ideal type or of an ideal-typical developmental
sequence, one seeks to make it clear
by the use of con
crete illustrative material drawn from empirical-histori
cal reality.
The danger in this procedure which in it
self is entirely legitimate lies in the fact that his
torical knowledge appears as a servant of theory instead
of the opposite role.
In other words,

if

secondary deviance

labeling theorists had originally portrayed
as an ideal construct,

they would have

compared it to various situations, highlighting the influences
that prevent labeling in order to better understand the in
fluences that reinforce deviant careers.

Consequently,

ideal

constructs are a particularly useful device for clearing up
some of the conceptual confusion surronding l a b el in g’s treat
ment of the social meanings of deviance.

Four Ideal Types of Deviance
The following pages will present four ideal types of
miscreant behavior:

(1) respectable,

rant and (4) dissident deviance.

(2) involuntary,

(3) aber

From the previous statements

on ideal types, the characteristics of these constructs can be
quickly described.

Keeping with W e b e r ’s design, the attributes,
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values and behavior accented by each type will be based on
"general empirical rules"—

that is, they will be drawn with

an eye for establishing an adequate causal relation.

Keep

ing with labeli n grs concerns, the subjective meanings attach
ed to each form of deviance will be related to corresponding
social reactions and consequences of sanctioning.

For these

ideal types, verification rests with, their heuristic potential
and theoretical suggestiveness, rather than with their exact
correspondence to actual social phenomena.

Respectable deviance-- Although informed middle-Americans
overwhelmingly see the problem of crime in terms of lower-class
behavior, they are also quite aware of many other forms of
deviance that appear in the newspapers everyday.

Watergate,

for instance, with its lengthy cast of characters and melo
dramatic moments, was probably the most publicly broadcasted
American scandal since McCarthy and his "witch hunts" during
the 1950s.
resigned,

But when it finally came to an end and Nixon
it was not at all clear what Americans considered

to be serious.
sighs of relief—

Across the nation prominent newsmen gave public
the crisis was over, the scandal put to rest,

Americans would be saved from the "torments" of Impeachment.
And sighs were given by less prominent Americans, too; not
because the Presidency had been spared, but because they had
been spared from the torments of week after week of televised
Impeachment hearings.

To a large extent, the seriousness of

N i x o n Ts crime was not that he had covered up a burglary, but
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that he had covered it up so badly and caused so much trouble.
Mills referred to such events as news of higher immoral
ities, and he suggested that Americans were quite accustomed
and hardly surprised by its announcement.

But to a certain

extent, this higher immorality is also a lower immorality.
Research on embezzlement, employee pilfrage, traffic viola
tions,

shoplifting and similar forms of respectable crime

suggest that these infractions are quite widespread, exceed
ing the more conventional forms of deviance in losses of
property and life.
instance, Ross

In a study of traffic violations, for

(1960-61) notes that 37,000 people died in

auto accidents as compared to 3,850 cases of murder and nonnegligent manslaughter in 19 58.

Similarly,

Schur (19 69)

suggests that the total amount of losses resulting from em
bezzlement are probably twice as much as the total amount
of losses accruing from burglaries, armed robberies, auto
thefts and pickpocketing.

Both higher and lower immoralities

are quite widespread in America, costing people considerably
more than conventional forms of crime.

Why, then, does

it raise so little alarm?
One reason is that these are forms of respectable deviance.
In traditional societies, respectable deviance is clearly
defined by sacred ceremonies,

in which normally miscreant acts

are encouraged and legitimized.

In modern societies, the

social boundaries of respectable deviance are considerably
less clear; perhaps disasters are the most clearly legitimate
grounds for deviance (Dynes, 1970).

Nevertheless, respectable
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,

deviance in modern communities is shaped and promoted by
underlying values within.American culture

(Schur, 1969).

For instance, business practises reflect two conflicting poles
of values.

On the one hand* transactions are supposedly govern

ed by a code of ethics which emphasizes honesty, trust and
public accountability; on the other hand, the smart business
deal, the quick transaction and the
the business world.

’con' are also values of

For those who engage in illegal activity,

there is a ready made list of justifications and values with
which to define their behavior as respectable deviance.
Respectable deviance is misconduct by respectable people
occurring in respectable situations or occupations.

Such

behavior only occassionally provokes strong social reactions,
since in many ways it is supported by values that either
directly encourage deviance or justify it as a common form of
misconduct.

This is particularly true with regard to amateur

shoplifters who steal as if they were competing against store
officials.

Accordingly,

positive attribute.
clever operator;

in these instances, deviance is a

He is a "strong" President;

she is a smart businesswoman.

she is a
In the eyes

of the respectable deviant, and often in the eyes of those who
react to him, he is not a criminal; while his actions may be
technically against the law, his behavior is not immoral.

It

is probably for this reason that when respectable deviants are
caught and confronted with criminal labels they often discon
tinue any further misconduct,

the label being too incongruous

with their personal image (Cameron, 19 64).
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Involuntary deviance—

Involuntary deviants are seen as

not responsible for their behavior.

All societies in some

form or another recognize this type.
ties,

In traditional communi

involuntary deviants are likely to be seen as possessed

by a demon or some evil spirit.
social meaning is the same:
his behavior."

Whichever is the case, the

"this person cannot be blamed for

In modern societies, the amount of involuntary

'deviance is likely to te greater than that characterizing
more traditional communities.

Yet, this increase results from

the redefining of involuntary deviance rather than from an
actual increase in its occurrence.

Modern communities give

rise to specialization, and along with this trend is a rise
in deviance specialists.
In recent years, Kittrie

(1973) notes, this trend has

been particularly evident in America.

While criminal law in

traditional societies assesses blame, determines degrees of
guilt and punishes miscreants accordingly, America has witness
ed a subtle departure from these functions in its criminal
system.

A different legal model has steadily been developing

which is described variously as "civil," "therapeutic" or
"parens patrie."

In this system, according to Kittrie, little

or no emphasis is placed on an individual's guilt, rather
importance is attached to a person's physical, mental or social
shortcomings.

When dealing with deviants,

act in a parental role

(parens patrie),

society is said to

seeking not to punish

but to change, resocialize, treat or cure the miscreant through
some appropriate therapy.

The consequences for involuntary
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deviants are subtly different from those of pther miscreants.
Under the criminal model, a deviant,
punished;

say a prostitute, is

she is given a fine to pay, a sentence to serve or

possibly both.

Under the therapeutic model, however, the

prostitute is not punished but treated, and the treatment,
which may be complete confinement, is not terminated until an
expert decides she has been "cured."

While the differences

may be subtle, they are certainly crucial.
Perhaps the most obvious example of involuntary deviance
is mentall illness, yet ^similarities can be found in several
other forms of illicit behavior as well.
example,

Lorber (1967), for

suggests that sick roles are convenient labels with

which to manage personal problems.

In the factory setting,

in personal relations and in interactional situations disabil
ity is sometimes faked to provide a legitimate reason for
escaping obligations.

Similarly,

has been defined as a disease.

in recent years alcoholism

Principally through the efforts

of Alcoholics A n o n y m o u s , Trice and Roman

(1970) argue, an

"allergy concept" of alcoholism has been gained.

According to

this view, those who become alcoholics possess a physiological
allergy to alcohol, and consequently their addiction is deter
mined long before they ever take their first drink.

As Trice

and Roman (19.70: 540) argue, "the significance of this concept
is that it serves to diminish., both in the perceptions of A.A.
members and their (family and friends), the a l c o h o l i c Ts r e 
sponsibility for developing the behavioral disorder."
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While the significance of involuntary deviance rests
in a disavowel of responsibility and in the corresponding
efforts by experts to return the miscreant to a "responsible"
state, the consequences vary according to the instances.

For

example, members of Alcoholics Anonymous actively seek to di
minish any interpretation of their behavior as mentally ill.
The idea of an allergy is conspicously medical, and the organ
ization visibly attempts to associate itself with the medical
profession

(Trice and Roman,

1970).

In the case of physical

or medical disorders, a person is not blamed;
mental disorders, a person is not trusted.
the form, however,

in the case of

Regardless of

involuntary miscreants are not blamed for

their behavior, and to the extent that they are subjected to
therapy, they are reliant on the discretion of those experts
who define deviance.
Aberrant deviance—

When most Americans talk about the

crime problem, they talk about aberrant deviance.
tional societies,

In tradi

she is the woman perpetually in the stocks

or the man being led slowly up the steps to the public gallows.
In modern communities,

she is the woman being picked up by the

vice squad or the man serving a life sentence in a Federal
Penitentiary.

They are the m u r d e r e r s , the armed robbers, the

rapists, the muggers.

Their behavior is feared, and their

faces are strikingly lower-class.

For the most part, these

are the people that middle- and upper-America pay l a w y e r s ,
judges, policemen, prison guards and prison officials to
manage, to protect them from.
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As the term aberrant implies, these deviants are seen
as morally inept, at least by conventional society.

Their

behavior is against the law, and unlike respectable deviance
it is viewed as wrong.

Their deviation from the s t a n d a r d s ^

are seen as culpable and a reflection of their personal
character.

When Mead and Durkheim spoke of behavior that

aroused public anger, provoked the taste for revenge and r e 
awakened in the community a sense of moral solidarity, they
were describing aberrant deviance.

Accordingly, this form

can provoke intense reactions from communities, and, indeed,
popular lore and actual history are full of examples.

Dur

ing the Chicago democratic convention in 19 68, the police en
gaged in what many saw as respectable deviance when they
clubbed and beat demonstrators protesting American involvement
in Viet Nam.

Undoubtedly there were a number of reasons for

the p o l i c e ’s use of "unusual tactics," such as D a l e y ’s conven
tion floor power tactics,

it was in part a community reaction

to perceived aberrant deviance.
Aberrant behavior,

like respectable deviance,

seen as guided by personal interests.

is generally

Unlike respectable

deviants, however, aberrant persons are not as fearful of a
criminal label.

Irwin and Cressey (1964) suggest that prison

cultures are influenced by several more general deviant cul
tures.

Two of these, thief and convict cultures, actually con

tain values regarding behavior during imprisonment.

Thieves

or professional criminals, Irwin and Cressey argue, face a
reoccurring' problem of imprisonment.

Consequently, most are
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aware of norms and patterns of behavior which apply to the
prison situation, and information on how to manage the prison
experience—

how to do time "standing on your head"-- with

the least amount of suffering and in the minimum amount of
time.

Those who Irwin and Cressey describe as convicts also

face a reoccurring adjustment to imprisonment.

But for these

"hard core" prisoners, the majority of which are lower-class,
norms and patterns of behavior appropriate to the prison situ
ation are recognizable in A m e r i c a 1s lower-class values.

In

both cases, the aberrant deviant is aware of the criminality
of his behavior, and he is prepared to manage the sanctions
applied to him because of it.
The aberrant deviant, like the respectable deviant,
contains both an image of the offender and an image of the
offense.

Study after study,

Clinard and Quinney (1973) argue,

portray the aberrant offenses, aberrant victims and aberrant
offenders as being part of the poorest and most deteriorated
sections of the major cities.

The aberrant pursues his b e 

havior for personal interests, and frequently he is aware of
norms that suggest the proper-means of coping with imprison
ment or official reactions.

The consequences of reactions

are varied, but at times when sanctions are harsh, they are
likely to stir anxiety and anger from the aberrant themselves.
While aberrants tend to be morally indifferent toward their
behavior, neither condemning nor justifying it, they do per
ceive a sense of justice, a set of informal rules that govern
the breaking and enforcing of laws.

Since sanctions can vary
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in intensity, a sense of injustice sometimes occurs, giving
objection not so much to the rules but to the rule enforcers.
Dissident deviance—

Merton (1971) has referred to this

form of behavior as nonconforming.

In a brief section of his

C on temp or ar y Social P r o b l e m s , Merton argues that there is
considerable difference between the courageous highwaymen of
seventeenth-century England and the equally courageous noncon
formists,

like Oliver Cromwell,

a distinction seems obvious,
detachment.

of that same time.

While such

it is one made easy by historical

In the instance of the Chicago riot, there were

a great many judgments at the time that made the leaders of
the march little more than criminals

(or worse yet communists)

heading up a sizable band of hoodlums and miscreants.
deviants,

These

especially becuase they tend toward organized pro

test, can only be euphemistically called nonconformists.

The

term dissident is more appropriate.
Aberrant,

involuntary and dissident deviance are very

closely related forms of miscreant behavior; the distinction
between each resting for the most part on whose view is being
considered.

Dissidents,

in that they openly violate community

norms, challenging the legitimacy of established values, are
often seen by officials as aberrants.

At other times, dissi

dents, especially if thy deviate alone, are sometimes defined
as involuntary miscreants.

In both instances, the effect is

the same: community definitions neutralize the appeal to;/
"higher values" or an "ultimate morality."

From SolzhenitsynTs

portrayal of Soviet political control and the history of the
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student movement in the sixties, both methods, aberrant and
involuntary counterdefinitions, are viable, modern responses
to dissident behavior.
Dissidence is usually not a private form of deviance.
The dissident is not trying to make extra dollars by juggling
the books; nor is he making a living by stealing from others.
The dissident deviates for a new morality or for the restora
tion of an old social goal.

Unlike the involuntary deviant,

the dissident accepts responsibility for his actions; unlike
the aberrant and respectable deviant, he disavows legitimacy
of the social standards,

seeking by his actions to either change

the law or bring into focus a new standard.

For these reasons,

the dissident often seeks to be publicly caught, to be given
a chance to publicly voice his opinion.
tioning by police,
dissidence,

sanc

judges and others often leads to increased

increased attempts to make opinions and views

known to those who will listen.
protestors,

Consequently,

The actions of the Viet Nam

such as Abbie Hoffman, for example, were directed

toward making actions more visible, particularly after their
initial confrontation with authorities.
Dissidence is not easily carried out alone.

The ability

to make a dissident definition stick depends largely on the
legitimacy of others.

It is easier for the dissident to con

vince others that he acts not for personal gain if he does not
act alone.

In the same way, it is easier for the dissident to

avoid an.,involuntary label if he does not act alone.

The

ability to organize, to present conflicting views in a group
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setting, largely determines the dissident definition.

Regard

less of organization or group support, however, dissidents
are likely to seek out public sanctioning, and increased
sanctioning is likely to encourage increased dissidence.

A Brief A p p li c at io n: Juvenile Delinquency
Part of the utility of ideal types rests in their mutual
exclusiveness on an analytic level, another part rests in
their relationships in actual social phenomena.

Weber,

for

instance, constructed his ideal types of domination in order
to analytically accent three dimensions of authority:
traditional and legal-rational.

charisma,

As precise ideal points of

view, they demonstrate their value by organizing the diverse
aspects of a dimension into logically consistent analytic
units.

But their most impressive demonstration of value rests

in their application to social phenomena.

Accordingly, Weber

uses each type to reveal the tensions and modified relations
inherent in the other forms of domination.

In construction,

each type represents a single logically possible causal re 
lation;

in application, each type provides a point of compari

son with which to understand a number of social phenomena,
casual relations and thus theoretically possible interpreta
tions.

In this sense, Weber rightfully insisted that ideal

types be verified according to their heuristic potential rather
than according to their exact replication by empirical facts.
Consequently, the four ideal types just presented must
.be applied in order to suggest their heuristic validity.

As
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the previous presentation shows, these types do overlap in
reality and do suggest relationships between themselves.
one point, the connections between involuntary,

At

aberrant and

dissident deviance were outlined, along with some of the cir
cumstances that affect the application of these social defi
nitions.
table

At another point, the relationships between respec

and aberrant deviance, particularly with regard to

nonprofessional shoplifters, were touched upon.

Additional

applications are needed, however, before determining the
heuristic potential of these types.

In the following para

graphs, a brief application of the types to juvenile delin
quency suggests some of this interpretive.potential.

The American juvenile justice system reflects an involun
tary model of deviance.

The official role of court officials,

probation officers and welfare agents is to "treat" the delin
quent, preventing him from going on to become an aberrant
deviant.

While culpability and punishment do play a part in

the juvenile justice system, they are, at least officially,
subordinate to the role of "parens patrie."

The Standard

Juvenile Court Act, proposed by the National Council on Crime
and Delinquency and designed to serve as a voluntary model for
various states, exemplifies the therapeutic discretion invested
in juvenile justice officials.
The court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in
proceedings: 1. Concerning any child who is alleged to
have violated any federal, state or local law or municipal
ordinance, regardless of where the violation occurred...
2. Concerning any child...(b) whose environment is

injurious to his own or o t h e r s ’ welfare; or
(c) who is beyond the control of his parents or
cutodian.
(Kittrie, 1973: 117)
While the first clause seeks specificty, the second clause
of the Act invests an almost limitless amount of discretion
in the juvenile official.

An adult must be charged with a

criminal act if he is going to be held by the police; but a
juvenile may be held because he lives in an ’’unsuitable”
environment or is ’’beyond” the control of his parents, regard
less of whether he is accused of committing any criminal act.
As Kittrie

(1973:

117) argues, this represents ’’...the perplex

ing possibility under the juvenile court system whereby a
person can lose his liberty not for something he does but

^

for something he is_. ”
Delinquents, however, are unlikely to view the juvenile
justice system in the same manner.

Unlike with mental or

physical health, there is no widespread interpretation of
delinquency as involuntary, the logical connection being con
siderably more tenuous.

Consequently, while juvenile official

operate according to the expectations of an involuntary system
of treatment, delinquents, depending on their behavior and
socioeconomic status, are likely to see their deviance as
either respectable or aberrant.

By most reports, almost every

child engages in some form of delinquent activity during his
legal status as a juvenile, and for those who are arrested,
the differences in expectations suggest some interesting
consequences for sanctioning.
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Deterrence is on possible effect of sanctioning, espe
cially with respectable delinquents.

Like their adult counter

parts, respectable delinquents are usually deterred from
further deviancy by the application of an aberrant label.
Clinard and Quinney (1973), for instance, note that many r e 
spectable del in qu en t s, especially those arrested for property
offenses or vandalism, express feelings of remorse or peni
tence.

Apprehension,

in other words, leads to the d e l i n q u e n t ’s

reevaluation of the meaning of his deviance—

"we d i d n ’t

think about being caught, we were thinking about having fun;”
"It d i d n ’t seem like then it would amount to m u ch ;” ”1 d i d n ’t
think it would cause so much trouble.”

In these instances,

deterrence results from the act of being publicly confronted
with a deviant label that is too discordant with a juv en il e’s
self image.

Aberrant delinquents, on the other hand, are

not as likely to be deterred by sanctioning.

Yet there is no

reason to believe that they are never deterred from further
deviance.

Since aberrants engage in more "serious” acts of

delinquency, they are likely to generate stern reactions.
If these reactions prove "too mu ch ,” the aberrant will desist
from further deviance also.
Encouragement for further delinquency is another possible
effect of sanctioning.

At this point, the conflict in defini

tions between delinquents and officials suggests some interest
ing causal relations.

Respectable delinquents,

for instance,

may be encouraged by the efforts of juvenile justice officials
to minimize the impact o f "apprehension and neutralize the
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application of criminal labels.

But the respectable delin

quent , not seeing himself as blameless, may interpret this
discretion as ineptness on the part of juvenile officials.
In other words, he may see himself as "conning the system,n
and thus he may be encouraged to commit further delinquency.
Of the two types, aberrant delinquents are the most likely
to be encouraged by the sanctioning originating from involun
tary systems.

If the sanction is too lenient, the aberrant

is provided with a relatively "inexpensive” means of.demonstrat
ing his courage and toughness, or his cunning and savvy to his
peers.

Aberrant delinquents, however, are more likely to re

ceive Severe sanctions, and if the sanctions are especially
severe, he is likely to sense or directly experience inequity
in the system (Matza,

1964).

In other words, the discretion

invested in juvenile officials is likely to be interpreted
by aberrants as unfair sanctioning, as being "singled out"
for punishment or as being "made an example."
The relations suggested above are objectively possible.
Their description, however,
these ideal types.

is only the first step in using

Undoubtedly, the juvenile justice system

operates within some combination of aberrant and involuntary
models of deviance.

An additional step, therefore, would con

sist of decomposing the system into those parts and situations
where an aberrant or an involuntary model are usually applied.
Just as the juvenile justice system is more complicated,

so

too are the attitudes and definitions that delinquents carry
about themselves and their actions.

What modifications are
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likely if an upper-class boy is caught committing an aberrant
act?

Conversely, what modifications are likely if a lower-

class boy is caught committing a respectable act?

All of these

things suggest additional steps needed to fully understand
the utility of the types for the study of juvenile delinquency.
Nevertheless,

some of the heuristic potential of these

types has been demonstrated.

In light of'the ideal types,

label in g’s indiscriminate assertion that stigmatizing reactions
cause deviance proves to be greatly oversimplified.
regard to respectable delinquents,

With

it was suggested that sanc

tioning usually results in deterrence.

And when it does not,

when sanctioning leads to further delinquency,

it is because

of the neutralization, not the maximization, of stigmatizing
labels.

Even with regard to aberrant delinquents,

claims are too simplistic.

labeling’s

When further delinquency occurs,

it is because of either a sensed injustice or an overly lenient
sanction.

While the first reason bares some resemblance to

L e m e r t ’s idea of secondary deviance as a role for ’’attack,”
the second reason suggests something different from labeling’s
central tenets.

If the application of the ideal types to the

juvenile justice system is any measure of their heuristic
validity, these types should prove helpful in clearing up some
of l a b e l i n g ’s conceptual confusion in other areas of deviance
as well.

CONCLUSION

What can be said about the labeling approach?

Certainly

it focuses attention on the social aspect's of deviance., on
the importance of social definitions and reactions to a com-/
plete understanding of deviance in modern society.

Accord

ingly, l ab e l i n g Ts greatest contribution is that it surpasses
the research interests of earlier practical pursuits-- such
as predicting who will violate parole, who will become delin
quent or who in general is more likely to commit deviant acts.
In other words,

labeling refreshingly redirects research and

theory beyond the legitimate but narrow concern with the causes
of deviant behavior.

By focusing on the moral meanings im

plied in interaction, by deliberately directing studies toward
understanding the significance of social definitions and
reactions,

labeling breaks the theoretical silence about social

influences, a silence that has characterized the study of
deviance for too long.
Under the labeling lens, Lemert

(1972:

3-25) rightfully

points out, the proper understanding of deviance is a critical ^
understanding of the larger society and its relationship to
the marginal groups that are singled out by social control as
outsiders.

In this’ sense,

intellectually serious,

if the study of deviance is to be

it cannot be restricted to the study
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of esoteric and exotic groups—

of topless barmaids and

swinging suburbanites, of motorcycle gangs and delinquent
street gangs.

Rather the study of crime and deviance must

concern itself with some of the broader social implications of
miscreant behavior.

In other words, la b el in gfs concern with

the, social meanings of deviance, their differential applica
tion and their relationship to larger patterns of social order
all suggest a refreshing return to some of the basic issues
proposed by classical social theorists.
In the preceeding paragraph the phrase "proper understand
ing" is crucial.

For in the final analysis,

it is against

this standard that labeling must be measured, and it is against
this standard that labeling is found clearly wanting.

Critical

understanding, especially the kind espoused by labeling the
orists, requires conceptual depth and precision-- a quality
that the approach unfortunately lacks.

Rather than develop

the issues raised about earlier theories,

like the distinction

between deviant acts and deviant labels, labeling theorists
defined the issues away.

Rather than develop the causal inter

actions between initial and secondary deviance,
rists defined away the exceptions.
approach rightfully argue,
prone to vulgarization;

labeling theo

As the critics of the

labeling is excessively loose and

its central claims are often contradic

tory and almost impossible to empirically verify.

Although

the labeling approach locates a crucial traget for research
and theory,

it fails to provide the means, the conceptual frame

work that would adequately aim explanatory efforts.
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The last section of this paper presented a strategy for
understanding some of these conceptual issues, especially
those revolving around the influence of social meanings on
deviant behavior.

The four ideal types—

respectable,

invol

untary, aberrant and dissident deviance— • outline four dis
tinct social meanings that are associated with deviance and
suggest some interesting relationships.

"Some of these rela

tionships were demonstrated with regard to dissident behavior
and juvenile delinquency, but even a cursory reflection on
the types suggests several other areas and possible relation
ships.

In order to explain the social issues highlighted by

the labeling approach,

in order to at least better understand

the complexity of those issues, an exstensive amount of con
ceptual exploration and elaboration is needed.

An ideal type

approach, especially as it was outlined by Weber (1949), is
quite amenable to these needs.
Nevertheless, there are some logical objections that
might be raised about this approach to labeling's conceptual
confusion.

Ideal types are not a widely accepted methodologi

cal strategy.

Even in Weber's own time, their use generated

some pointed criticisms.

In the Protestant Ethic and the

Spirit of C a p it al is m, Weber (1958) formulated ideal types for
both American protestantism and capitalism, and then used the
former to explain the latter's occurrence.

Several critics

(see Tawney's foreward to the 1958 edition)

strongly objected

to Weber's "exaggerations" of ethical factors.

Today, dis

approval is all the more likely, since ideal types are not
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directly amenable to empirical research.

Weber, to recall,

concerned himself with historical trends and their explana
tions, and considering his topics ideal types were very use
ful and efficient*

On a lower level of abstraction, however,

given the need to operationalize concepts, does not an ideal
type approach fall victim to the same empirical rootlessness
that chracterizes labeling?

Does not an ideal type simply

replace one obtuse construct

with yet another?

Perhaps.

But perceptual bluntness in this instance

would be caused more by the nature of sociology and criminology
than by the strategy itself.

A case, although a somewhat

tendentious one, can be made for the assertion

that labeling

was originally intended as a heuristic and not an explanatory
framework.

This is especially true with regard to L e m e r t fs

(1951; 1967; 1972) writings.

In this sense, the ap p r o a c h ’s

conceptual confusion resulted from the nature of the discipline.
Rather than explore the conceptual relations suggested by
the approach,

sociologists and criminologists pushed it into

a neat, unambiguous scientific box —
than B (secondary deviance).

if A (social reaction) \/

In the years surronding B e c k e r ’s

(1963) O u t s i d e r s , most theorists were interested in being
associated with label in g’s radical tone; in the years surrond
ing popular scepticism, most theorists are interested in
being associated with l a b el in g’s ffpungent and perceptive"
critics.

During both periods, few seemed interested in elabo

rating or salvaging its research tragets.

Of course, explor

ation and elaboration tend to demand more patience, more in
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depth analysis than the current need to "publish or perish"
might allow.

This is to say that the approach, the use of

ideal types, rests its utility on the sociological concern
to penetrate some complex and difficult problems, and this
reliance might well be its most wanting characteristic.
In a sense, all of this argues the importance of
research into social definitions,
ings attached to behavior.

into the subjective m ea n

As Weber well understood, the

practical types expressed by men and women, the values and
goals to which they verbally aspire, often provide insightful
points of comparison.

This is, of course, the classical

methodology, the one that guided the intellectual excitement
of such diverse theorists as Marx, Durkheim, Tonnies and
Weber in their comparison of desired social values with what
actually exists.

Such a

methodology applied to sociology

and criminology itself, might suggest a number of interesting \/
relations,

interesting disparities between what is desired

and what actually occurs.

It might suggest what makes a

"good" theory of deviance or what makes a "bad” one; and,
of course, it might suggest the utility of using ideal types,
or any other heuristic framework for that matter,
logical and criminological inquiry.
another assessment.

in socio

But then that is
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